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THE ABA GUIDELINES AND THE NORMS OF
CAPITAL DEFENSE REPRESENTATION
Russell Stetler*
W. Bradley Wendel**
The ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ("Guidelines"), as revised in
2003,1 continue to stand as the single most authoritative summary of the
prevailing professional norms in the realm of capital defense practice.
Hundreds of court opinions have cited the Guidelines. 2 They have been
particularly useful in helping courts to assess the investigation and
presentation of mitigating evidence in death penalty cases. This Article
will discuss how these Guidelines have come to reflect prevailing
professional norms in this critical area of capital defense practice 3 and
how that practice has developed in the era of the modem U.S. death
penalty. One of the principal arguments we will make in this Article is
that courts interpreting the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel should look to what competent lawyers ought to do
rather than what some lawyers appointed to represent capital defendants
*

Russell Stetler is the National Mitigation Coordinator for the federal death penalty

projects. He is based in the office of the Federal Public Defender in Oakland, California. The views
expressed in this Article are his own.
** W. Bradley Wendel is a Professor of Law at Cornell University.
1. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES].

2. See List of Cases Citing 1989 ABA Guidelines, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
content/darn/aba/migrated/201 1_build/death__penaltyrepresentation/1989list.authcheckdam.pdf
(last updated Aug. 6, 2012); List of Cases Citing 2003 ABA Guidelines, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/201 1_build/death_penaltyrepresentation/20
03list.authcheckdam.pdf (last updated Jan. 8, 2013).
3. "[Ilmagining, collecting, and presenting what is generically called 'mitigation' evidence,"
viz. any evidence tending "to humanize the client in the eyes of those who will decide his fate," is
"arguably the central [] duty of counsel in a capital case," one which "pervades the responsibilities
of defense counsel from the moment of detention on potentially capital charges to the instant of
execution." Eric M. Freedman, Re-stating the Standardof Practicefor Death Penalty Counsel: The
Supplementary Guidelinesfor the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases,
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 663, 664 (2008).
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actually do. Looking to the prevailing practices or customs of some
segments of the defense bar to set the standard of competent
performance in capital cases may have the effect of ratifying inadequate
representation. Courts should instead consider authoritative statements
by the profession concerning the competence that may reasonably be
demanded of attorneys in this vital role.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE "CARDIAC SURGERY
OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION"

The example of investigating mitigating evidence shows the role of
professional guidelines in setting the standard of competent performance
for lawyers. Clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S.
Supreme Court, holds that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
representation requires a thorough investigation of potential mitigating
evidence in death penalty cases. Beginning in 2000, the Court has
confirmed this point in five cases-Williams v. Taylor,4 Wiggins v.
Smith,5 Rompilla v. Beard,6 Porter v. McCollum, 7 and Sears v. Upton.8
In each of these cases, the Court found trial counsel ineffective for
failing to investigate potential mitigating evidence. Every case except
Sears was tried in the 1980s, and Sears was tried in 1993.
In Williams, the Court reaffirmed an all-encompassing view of
mitigation and found trial counsel ineffective for failing to prepare the
mitigation case until a week before the 1986 trial.9 The Court
additionally found trial counsel ineffective for failing to conduct an
investigation of the readily available mitigating evidence (nightmarish
childhood, borderline retardation, model prisoner status, etc.).' 0 In
Wiggins, a case tried in 1989, trial counsel were found deficient in their
performance even though they had had their client examined by one
mental health expert, because they failed to conduct a complete social
history investigation in accordance with the original edition of the
Guidelines (published in 1989):11 "Despite these well-defined norms,
4. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
5. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
6. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
7. 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam).
8. 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam).
9. Williams, 529 U.S. at 395.
10. Id. at 395-96.
11, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523-24.
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however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's
background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his
history from a narrow set of sources. 12 In Rompilla, tried in 1988,
counsel were found deficient "even when a capital defendant's family
members and the defendant himself ha[d] suggested that no mitigating
evidence [wa]s available,"' 3 and despite consulting three mental health
experts.1 4 Similarly, in Porter, also tried in 1988, counsel were found
deficient despite a "fatalistic [and] uncooperative" client because "that
does not obviate the need for defense counsel to conduct [a thorough]
mitigation investigation."' 5 Quoting Williams, the Court in Porter
reaffirmed this duty: "It is unquestioned that under the prevailing
professional norms at the time of Porter's trial, counsel had an
'obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's
background."",16 Among the mitigation evidence that Porter's counsel
failed to present was "brain damage that could manifest in impulsive,
violent behavior."' 7 In Sears, the Court found trial counsel ineffective in
the 1993 trial even though they had presented seven witnesses in the
penalty proceedings. 18 The Court noted: "We have never limited the
prejudice inquiry under Strickland to cases in which there was only
'little or no mitigation evidence' presented.. .. ,'9 Post-conviction
evidence emphasized significant frontal lobe brain damage causing
deficiencies in cognitive functioning and reasoning.2 °
While these five cases illustrate the Court's guiding principle
linking effective capital defense representation to thorough mitigation
investigation, many judges and justices-and indeed many lawyersremain confused about exactly what the prevailing norms are now or
what they were at the time when an old case went to trial. To elucidate
norms, whether then or now, we must begin with an understanding of
how norms and standards come to be established. Professor Lawrence J.
Fox has referred to capital defense representation as the "cardiac surgery

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 524.
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 379.
Porter, 558 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 452 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)).
Id. at 36.
Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261 (2010) (per curiam).
Id. at3266.
Id. at 3261.
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of legal representation.",21 The standard of care for cardiac surgeons is,
of course, not set by just any physician with a medical degree and a
license to practice. Treatment guidelines for medical specialties are
based on a combination of scientific evidence and collaboration between
the professionals who have devoted their careers to the area of
practice-for example, peer review by the cardiac surgeons
themselves.22 Similarly, the standard of care in capital defense
21. Lawrence J. Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing
Responsibilities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775, 777 (2008) [hereinafter Capital Guidelines]. Professor
Fox traces the specific performance standards articulated in the 2003 Guidelines and the
SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES], to
fundamental ethical duties first adopted by the ABA as rules of professional conduct over a century
ago. He notes that "there is universal recognition that the rules establish measurable levels of
performance that lawyers are in fact expected to achieve." Capital Guidelines, supra, at 775-76. He
continues: "Indeed, in this author's opinion, the core principles expressed in the ABA Guidelines,
commentary, and Supplementary Guidelines are no more than detailed, contextualized explanations
of counsel's existing obligations under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. at 776. He
concludes: "The ABA Guidelines set forth a thorough commentary of the critical factors one would
need to evaluate to determine competence in the area of capital defense." Id. at 777. In an earlier
article, Professor Fox stated:
Even if former counsel is not prepared to move heaven and earth to save the former
client, the new ABA Guidelines officially recognize an idea that has already been
commonly acknowledged in practice-that the former lawyer has a significant obligation
to help extricate the former client from his present plight. And once it is understood that
this long-standing obligation has a firm foundation in the mandates of our profession's
rules of professional conduct, the former counsel should recognize that what he or she
has is not merely a hortatory goal, but a firm obligation.
Lawrence J. Fox, Making the Last Chance Meaningful: Predecessor Counsel's Ethical Duty to the
Capital Defendant, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1181, 1193 (2003) (footnote omitted).
22. See, for example, Opinion 9.10 of the American Medical Association's Code of Medical
Ethics, which states:
Medical society ethics committees, hospital credentials and utilization committees, and
other forms of peer review have been long established by organized medicine to
scrutinize physicians' professional conduct. At least to some extent, each of these types
of peer review can be said to impinge upon the absolute professional freedom of
physicians. They are, nonetheless, recognized and accepted .... They balance the
physician's right to exercise medical judgment freely with the obligation to do so wisely
and temperately.
Opinion 9.10 - Peer Review, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion910.page# (last updated June 1994); see
Opinion 9.14 - Quality, AM. MED. ASS'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physicianresources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion914.page
(last visited July 18, 2013)
(discussing the need to monitor care "through personal case review and critical self-reflection, peer
review, and... other quality improvement tools"); see also Denise Grady, Study Criticizes Care in
Cancer of the Ovaries, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at Al. According to the newspaper report, a new
study reported at a meeting of the Society of Gynecologic Oncology, found that most women with
ovarian cancer receive "inadequate care" because they are "treated by doctors and hospitals that see
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representation is set not by just any lawyer who happens to have a
bar card but by the professionals who specialize in this complex area
of practice.23
Although the rule is sometimes stated that the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases is set by prevailing professional norms, the
reality is more complex. Courts do refer to prevailing professional norms
but take a critical attitude toward them. It is not simply a matter of
surveying the medical profession to ascertain what is the usual practice.
Rather, courts look for evidence of considered judgment within the
profession concerning the standard of care.24 In many instances,
considered medical judgment will be reflected in the prevailing
standards of practicing physicians. In other cases, however, the bulk of
medical practitioners considered as a whole have failed to adopt a
practice that is in the best interests of patients. Numerous state court
decisions refer to the standard of a reasonable and prudent physician, as
opposed to that of the custom of the profession.
Standards of care in the legal profession similarly reflect the
judgment of courts concerning what lawyers ought to do, rather than
what a numerical majority of lawyers in fact do. In other words, the
objective standard of the reasonable professional is prescriptive as well
as descriptive. It is informed by evolving norms within the profession
but not limited to them. Just as it is possible for experienced physicians
to consider prevailing practices and conclude that physicians should be
doing more to protect patients, the legal profession may reflect on the
customs of the defense bar and conclude, in some cases, that lawyers
could do a better job. For example, if scientific research discloses new
findings about how people make decisions, defense lawyers ought to be
expected to put reasonable effort into learning about it rather than simply
relying on the way they have always defended cases. As discussed in

few cases of the disease and lack expertise in the complex surgery and chemotherapy that can
prolong life." Id. The study analyzed medical records of 13,321 women with ovarian cancer
diagnosed from 1999 to 2006 in California and found that "[o]nly 37 percent received treatment that
adhered to guidelines set by the National Comprehensive Cancer Network, an alliance of 21 major
cancer centers with expert panels that analyze research and recommend treatment." id
23. See Vivian Berger, The Chiropractoras Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital
Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC CHANGE 245, 250 (1991) (highlighting this point).
24. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 242 (2000); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: MalpracticeLaw at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 163, 170, 172 (2000).
25. See Peters, supra note 24, at 172-76 (citing state court cases referring to this standard).
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Part II, the objective standard of reasonableness articulated in Strickland
v. Washington26 is best understood as using the considered judgment of
the legal profession as a benchmark rather than mere custom. As we will
argue in Part III, it is particularly important for courts to rely on official
statements such as the Guidelines rather than look only to the practices
of lawyers representing capital defendants because of the tendency of all
decision-makers, including judges, to make erroneous judgments based
on incomplete evidence.
Standards in medicine rely heavily on scientific advancements
based on rigorous clinical research. The dean of one medical school in
the Northeast reportedly told each first-year class at the beginning of the
term, "Half of what we are going to teach you is wrong, and half of it is
right. Our problem is that we don't know which half is which.'
Treatment guidelines evolve based on advances in scientific knowledge.
Capital defense representation has a more attenuated link to science, but
it is nonetheless important to note where the links do exist-in social
science and in our rapidly advancing understanding of the neurobiology
of brain-behavior relationships.
A robust body of empirical social science research informs capital
defense practitioners' understanding of how jurors make life and death
decisions in the selection phase of capital trials. The Capital Jury Project
("CJP") was "[ijnitiated in 1991 by a consortium of university-based
researchers with support from the National Science Foundation. 28 Over
the next two decades, the CJP interviewed 1198 jurors from 353 capital
trials in fourteen states, using structured interviews of three to four hours
in duration.29 Some fifty articles based on the CJP data have been
published, along with books and doctoral dissertations, completed and in
progress. 30 The interviews elicit both predetermined response options to
structured questions and narrative accounts in jurors' own words in
26. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
27. Past Deans of the Faculty of Medicine, HARV. MED. SCH., http://hms.harvard.edu/abouthms/facts-figures/past-deans-faculty-medicine (last visited July 18, 2013).
28.

What

Is

the

Capital Jury Project?,

UNIV.

AT

ALB.:

SCH.

CRIM.

JUST.,

http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php (last visited July 18, 2013) (providing a detailed description
of the work of the CJP); see also William J. Bowers, The CapitalJury Project: Rationale,Design,
andPreview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1077 (1995).
29. What Is the CapitalJury Project?,supranote 28.
30. Publications, UNIV. AT ALB.: SCH. CRIM. JUST., http://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php
(last visited July 18, 2013) (listing many such publications); see also SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE
AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH PENALTY, at xiii-xiv (2005).
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response to open-ended questions. 3 1 These empirical findings have
provided capital defense practitioners with an informed basis for
investigating and presenting the kinds of mitigating evidence that jurors
have found effective,32 in the most effective manner,33 and at all stages
of the trial (including voir dire and the guilt-innocence phase) because of
the well-documented conclusion that nearly half of the jurors believed
they knew what the punishment should be before the sentencing phase of
the trial began.34 In addition to the CJP's body of work, capital defense
31. What Is the CapitalJury Project?,supra note 28.
32. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1571 tbl.8 (1998) (finding mental illness, mental impairment, and
acceptance of responsibility highly mitigating, as well as child abuse carrying weight); Stephen P.
Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 26, 26, 63-64 (2000)
(finding how empathy decreases the likelihood that jurors will vote for death but that the sentencing
process systematically distances jurors from defendants); Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and
Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1557, 1574-75, 1590-91 (1998) (finding a denial defense more likely to result in a death
sentence, and without acceptance of responsibility, jurors are more cynical about child abuse and
other mitigation). Several articles have also examined what makes jurors choose death rather than
life: William J. Bowers et al., The Capital Sentencing Decision: Guided Discretion, Reasoned
Moral Judgment, or Legal Fiction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 413, 429-

31 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT] (discussing the
effects of the manner of the killing, legal misunderstanding of presumption of death, and
defendant's perceived demeanor on jurors' decision to impose the death penalty); Michael E.
Antonio et al., CapitalJurorsas the Litmus Test of Community Consciencefor the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 87 JUDICATURE 274, 280 (2004) (discussing how defendant's courtroom demeanor is key
in influencing impressions jurors have of the defendant, including whether attorneys seemed to have
a close relationship with the defendant); Ursula Bentele & William J.Bowers, How JurorsDecide
on Death: Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 1011, 1041 (2001) (finding that close to five out of ten jurors believed they must
impose death penalty if crime was "heinous, vile or depraved," with four out often believing death
to be necessary based on a finding of future dangerousness); John H. Blume et al., Future
Dangerousnessin Capital Cases: Always "At Issue," 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 407 & tbl.2 (2001)
(finding nearly seventy percent of jurors reported that preventing defendant from killing was
important even though the prosecution did not put future dangerousness "at issue").
33. See Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REv. 1109, 1123, 1180-81 (1997) (finding jurors did
not like defense expert witnesses' testimony unless supported by contemporaneous information
from lay witnesses, and also finding that defense experts accounted for two-thirds of the witnesses
jurors thought backfired).
34. See AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT, supra note 32, at 425-28 (explaining that most jurors
reported discussing punishment during the guilt phase and that the earlier the punishment decision is
made, the more likely it is for death); Bowers, supra note 28, at 1091 & tbl.8, 1092 (explaining that
a "good many" of the jurors were "absolutely convinced" of the appropriate punishment-usually
death-before the sentencing phase even began); William J.Bowers et al., ForeclosedImpartiality
in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and PrematureDecision
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practice has been informed by the research of many other academics
who have studied aspects of capital punishment. For example, Craig
Haney, a social psychologist from the University of California, Santa
Cruz, has published widely on research related to mitigation. 5 Michael
L. Radelet, a sociologist from the University of Colorado and a prolific
author on race effects, deterrence, wrongful convictions, and other
issues, has long maintained a chronological inventory of every non36
statutory mitigating factor ever found in a Florida death penalty case.
As Professor Haney has pointed out, "The legal standards
governing capital mitigation evolved over the same period that a number
of important developments were taking place in psychology and related
disciplines. 37 Professor Haney has emphasized research in social
psychology in particular, but his point extends to other scientific
advances over the past thirty years. These include the revolution in
neurobiology following technological breakthroughs in neuroimaging,
allowing scientists to study brain functioning in real time,38 the decoding
of the human genome and breakthrough research in the genetic
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1488 & tbl.l,
1491-92 (1998) (explaining that interviews with
864 capital jurors in eleven states revealed that almost half of those jurors believed they knew what
the punishment should be before the sentencing phase of trial began and that approximately
seventy-five percent of those jurors never wavered from their initial choice). This research has led
to the well-established capital defense practice of "frontloading" mitigating evidence during voir
dire and the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital
Representation: The Necessity of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 1044 (2008).
35. See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM (2005). His influential articles include: Craig Haney, Condemning the
Other in Death Penalty Trials. Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic
Divide, 53 DePAUL L. REV. 1557 (2004); Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing
the Nature and Logic of CapitalMitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (2008) [hereinafter Haney,
Evolving Standards];Craig Haney, Media Criminology and the Death Penalty, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
689 (2009); Craig Haney, On Mitigation as Counter-Narrative:A Case Study of the Hidden Context
of Prison Violence, 77 UMKC L. REV. 911 (2009); Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital
Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547 (1995); Craig
Haney, Violence and the CapitalJury: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement and the Impulse to
Condemn to Death,49 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1997).
36.

See MICHAEL RADELET, FLORIDA DEATH CASES WHERE NON-STATUTORY MITIGATORS

WERE FOUND: A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST, BY DATE OF SENTENCE (last updated Aug. 9, 2012) (on file
with Hofstra Law Review). The list of non-statutory mitigating factors ran to 241 pages when last
updated on August 9, 2012. Id.
37. Haney, Evolving Standards,supra note 35, at 855-56.
38. See, e.g., RITA CARTER, MAPPING THE MIND 13 (1998) (summarizing how neuroimaging
has permitted localization of brain activity that creates specific experiences and behavioral
responses).
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epidemiology of mental illness, 39 advances in psychopharmacology and
neurochemistry, 4° and the study of gene-environment interactions
rendering the traditional nature versus nurture debate obsolete and
giving rise to epigenetics (non-DNA based changes in gene function).4'
in addition, two wars have tragically heightened our awareness of the
consequences of trauma and traumatic brain injury.42 Capital defense
practitioners have been obliged to keep current with all of these complex
scientific developments.43
Many of the post-Furman v. Georgia4 statutory sentencing
schemes followed the Model Penal Code, in which two of the model
mitigating factors explicitly involve mental or emotional disturbance and
impaired capacity. 45 Not surprisingly, expert testimony in capital
39. See IRVING GOTTESMAN & STEVEN 0. MOLDIN, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND GENETIC RISKS: A
GUIDE TO GENETIC COUNSELING 1 (1998); Deborah W. Denno, Courts' Increasing Consideration
of BehavioralGenetics Evidence in Criminal Cases.: Results of a Longitudinal Study, 2011 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 967, 1010-11; Steven 1. Friedland, The Criminal Law Implications of the Human
Genome Project. Reimagining a Genetically Oriented Criminal Justice System, 86 KY. L.J. 303,
335 (1998); Erick L. Messias et al., Epidemiology of Schizophrenia: Review of Findingsand Myths,
30 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 323, 333 (2007).
40. See AM. SOC'Y FOR NEUROCHEMISTRY, BASIC NEUROCHEMISTRY: MOLECULAR,
CELLULAR AND MEDICAL ASPECTS 665-67 (George J. Siegel et al. eds., 6th ed. 1999).
41. See NESSA CAREY, THE EPIGENETICS REVOLUTION: How MODERN BIOLOGY IS
REWRITING OUR UNDERSTANDING OF GENETICS, DISEASE, AND INHERITANCE 6-9, 42-45 (2012);

Robert Sanger, Close Test Scores and Epigenetics in Atkins Cases, FORUM, Apr. 2012, at 27, 28
(2012).
42. See, e.g., CENTER FOR MIL. HEALTH POL'Y RESEARCH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST

RECOVERY, at xix (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008) (explaining how modem medicine
and technology have increased the "invisible wounds" surviving servicemembers suffer from
deployment experiences and the resulting intensification of studies to address mental injuries);
Richard A. Bryant et al., Implications for Service Delivery in the Military, in PTSD AND MILD
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 235, 235-36, 237 tbl.12.1 (Jennifer J. Vasterling et al. eds., 2012);
Kathleen Wayland, The Importance of Recognizing Trauma Throughout Capital Mitigation
Investigationsand Presentations,36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 929 (2008).
43. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 8.1, at 976-77 (noting that Guideline
8.1 .B. 10 and 8.1 .C require the re-training of lawyers in current scientific developments every two
years); SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 21, Guideline 8. 1, at 685 (noting that Guideline
8.1 requires annual re-training of relevant practitioners).
44. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
45. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). For statutory
mitigating factors which track the language proposed by the Model Penal Code, see, for example,
the lists in 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13701-E (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2008); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18.1.3-1201(4) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2006); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 § 9-i.C (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9.c (West 2012); KY.
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sentencing proceedings began as soon as the new statutes were enacted
in the 1970s. 46 By the mid-1980s, in a case involving a delusional
defendant named Glen Burton Ake, the Supreme Court held that an
indigent capital defendant had a right to a psychiatric evaluation at state
expense.47 Capital defense practitioners repeatedly stressed the value of
multidisciplinary teams with a variety of perspectives. Writing in 1984,
capital litigator Kevin McNally noted: "We must try death cases, or
negotiate them, by understanding the people involved, not by reading the
statute. Who better to help us than those who study, and sometimes
understand, human behavior? ''48 Forensic social workers wrote that their
"psychosocial expertise" had proven useful in enhancing capital defense
in the early 1980s. 49 Only expert testimony could offer an interpretive
framework for understanding mitigating evidence. As David C. Stebbins
and Scott P. Kenney wrote: "Friends, family members, neighbors,
teachers, prison personnel, etc., can testify to facts, but cannot render
opinions as to how the family background, life experiences, physical and
psychological conditions bear on the creation of the person whose life or

REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5
(2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6) (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3 (West 2012);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-2000(f) (2011); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29-2523(2) (West 2009); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.035 (West 2000); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 630.5.VI (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-3.c(5) (West 2005); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6 (West 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9711 (e) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-2040) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(4) (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2264.4.B (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070 (West 2012); and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-21020) (2011); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 n.44 (1976) (quoting the Model Penal
Code with approval); OKLA. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRuM. § 4-79 (West 2007).
46. See George E. Dix, Participation by Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder
Sentencing, 1 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 283, 283 (1978).
47. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that denial of expert psychiatric
assistance to indigent defendant where sanity was a significant factor at both guilt and penalty
phases of trial constituted a denial of due process).
48. Kevin McNally, Death Is Different: Your Approach to a Capital Case Must Be Different,
Too, CHAMPION, Mar. 1984, at 8, 13.

49. Cessie Alfonso & Katharine Baur, Enhancing CapitalDefense: The Role of the Forensic
Clinical Social Worker, CHAMPION, June 1986, at 26, 26 (citing their experience in "the last five
years").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss3/7

10

Stetler and Wendel: The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Representatio

20131

THE NORMS OFCAPITAL REPRESENTATION

death is to be decided."5 ° Other articles focused on representing capital
clients with disabling mental impairments. 51
Meanwhile, public psychiatric hospitals had been closed,
community mental health services were being defunded, and jails and
prisons were becoming the de facto care providers to an enormous
number of indigent persons with mental illness.52 By 2005, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics found that more than half of all prison and jail inmates
had mental health problems.53 Capital practitioners came to understand
that mental disorders and impairments often interfere with the defense
team's efforts to build a relationship of trust with their clients 54 and selfdestructive behaviors often reflect underlying mental disorders.5
The Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence has also
underscored how important it is for capital practitioners to understand
emerging neuroscience and related developments in psychiatry and
psychology. In 2002, the Court established a categorical ban on
executing people with mental retardation (now referred to as intellectual
disability).56 Three years later, the Court also prohibited the execution of
people whose crimes were committed before they had reached eighteen

50. David C. Stebbins & Scott P. Kenney, Zen and the Art of MitigationPresentation,or, The
Use of Psycho-Social Experts in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, CHAMPION, Aug. 1986, at 14,
16-18.
51. See, e.g., John Blume, Representing the Mentally Retarded Defendant, CHAMPION, Nov.
1987, at 32, 32-38; Mary Swift, Representing the Developmentally DisabledOffender, CHAMPION,
Apr. 1988, at 10, 10-11, 41.
52. See TERRY A. KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS
AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT 11-14 (1999) (discussing the insufficiency of community
funding following deinstitutionalization and also explaining the higher prevalence of mental health
problems among the incarcerated, exacerbated by changes in conditions of confinement); E. FULLER
TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 8, 9 fig.l.2
(1997) (demonstrating that the hospitalized mentally ill population reduced from approximately
565,000 in 1955 to approximately 70,000 in 1995).
53. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (estimating 705,600 prisoners with
mental health problems in state prisons, 79,800 in federal prisons, and 479,900 in local jails).
54. See Russell Stetler, Mental Disabilitiesand Mitigation, CHAMPION, Apr. 1999, at 49, 49.
55. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103
MICH. L. REv. 939, 962 & tbl.2, 963 (2005) (explaining that analysis of 106 "volunteer" executions
of prisoners who had waived appeals found that eighty-eight percent had struggled with mental
illness and/or substance abuse, including fourteen with schizophrenia, others with delusions,
twenty-three with depression or bipolar disorder, and ten with post-traumatic stress disorder).
56. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
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years of age. 5 7 Amicus briefs in support of the ban on juvenile
executions presented evidence that the brain is not fully developed
until individuals reach their early twenties, thereby providing a scientific
understanding of youthful impulsivity.58 In all five cases where the
Court has found trial counsel ineffective for failing to conduct
thorough mitigation investigations, the Court noted the evidence
of cognitive impairment and brain damage presented in postconviction proceedings. 9
II.

THE STRICKLAND STANDARD

In 1984, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor delivered the opinion in
which the Supreme Court attempted to set out "the proper standards for
judging a criminal defendant's contention that the Constitution requires
a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel's
assistance at the trial or sentencing was ineffective." 6 She began by
reciting the grisly facts of the crimes that had led to David Leroy

Washington's death sentence (crimes that "included three brutal stabbing
murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murders,
attempted extortion, and theft" over a ten-day period).61 She also noted
that the State of Florida had appointed "an experienced criminal
63
lawyer., 62 Mr. Washington, however, did not follow counsel's advice.
57. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
58.

See Brief for Am. Med. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5, Roper

v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/
upload/mm395/roper-v-simmons.pdf.
59. Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259, 3261-62 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting an expert's opinion
that "Sears performs at or below the bottom first percentile in several measures of cognitive
functioning and reasoning" partly due to "significant frontal lobe brain damage," and explaining
that Sears had "problems with planning, sequencing and impulse control"); Porter v. McCollum,
558 U.S. 30, 36 (2009) (per curiam) (explaining that Porter had "substantial difficulties with

reading, writing, and memory," along with "cognitive defects," and that state experts could not "rule
out a brain abnormality"); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390-93 (2005) (noting that Rompilla
had a "third grade level of cognition after nine years of schooling," suffered from "organic brain
damage, an extreme mental disturbance significantly impairing several of his cognitive functions,"

and that Rompilla's "IQwas in the mentally retarded range"); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 518,
523 (2003) (noting that social service records documented "borderline retardation" and that testing
determined Wiggins to have "an IQ of 79 [and] difficulty coping with demanding situations");
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 370 (1999) (noting that Williams was "borderline mentally
retarded," with "mental impairments" possibly "organic in origin").
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984).

61. Id.at671-72.
62. Id. at 672.
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He confessed to the murders, waived his right to a jury trial, and pleaded
guilty to all charges, including three counts of capital murder. 64 He also
waived his right to an advisory jury (against counsel's advice) and chose
to be sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation.6 5
In the plea colloquy, Mr. Washington told the court that he had no
significant prior criminal record (beyond "a string of burglaries"), that
he was under "extreme stress caused by his inability to support his
family," and that he accepted responsibility for the crimes. 6 Trial
counsel conducted almost no investigation in preparation for the
sentencing hearing. He spoke with Mr. Washington about his
background, talked with Mr. Washington's wife and mother by
telephone ("though he did not follow up on the one unsuccessful effort
to meet with them"), "did not otherwise seek out character witnesses,"
and saw no reason to request a psychiatric examination.67 Justice
O'Connor summed up trial counsel's strategy:
Counsel decided not to present and hence not to look further for
evidence concerning respondent's character and emotional state. That
decision reflected trial counsel's sense of hopelessness about
overcoming the evidentiary effect of respondent's confessions to the
gruesome crimes. It also reflected the judgment that it was advisable to
rely on the plea colloquy for evidence about respondent's background
and about his claim of emotional stress: the plea colloquy
communicated sufficient information about these subjects, and by
forgoing the opportunity to present new evidence on these subjects,
counsel prevented the State from cross-examining respondent
on his
68
claim and from putting on psychiatric evidence of its own.
At sentencing, trial counsel put forth no evidence but instead
argued that Mr. Washington's remorse and acceptance of responsibility
justified sparing his life because he was "fundamentally a good person
who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful
circumstances., 69 The trial judge nonetheless found that all three
murders were especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel; were committed
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672-73.
Id. at 673 (citations omitted).
Id. at 673-74.
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in the course of at least one other violent felony; involved pecuniary
70
gain; and were committed to avoid arrest and hinder law enforcement.
Though the judge acknowledged that "there was no admitted evidence of
prior convictions," he noted that Mr. Washington had "stated that he
engaged in a course of stealing."' 7' The judge found that the aggravating
circumstances clearly far outweighed the mitigation72 and imposed three
death sentences for the murders and prison terms for the other crimes.73
Mr. Washington raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
in state collateral proceedings but was denied relief without an
evidentiary hearing. 74 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of
relief 75 The claims were then litigated in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida.76 Habeas corpus counsel offered
proof in the form of affidavits and reports.77 Both trial counsel and the
trial judge testified at an evidentiary hearing. 78 The District Court faulted
trial counsel for "errors in judgment" for failing to investigate nonstatutory mitigation but found no prejudice.79 On appeal, the case
ultimately went en banc to the newly formed Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit.80 According to Justice O'Connor: "The full Court of
Appeals developed its own framework for analyzing ineffective
assistance claims and reversed the judgment of the District Court and
remanded the case for new factfinding under the newly announced
standards.",81 Superintendent Charles E. Strickland petitioned for a writ
of certiorari.8 2 Justice O'Connor noted that the petition "present[ed] a
type of Sixth Amendment claim
that this Court ha[d] not previously
83
considered in any generality.,
Justice O'Connor's opinion is full of cautionary admonitions:
"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential";
70. Id.at 674.
71.

Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.at675.
Id.at 675-76.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 679.
Id.
Id.at 683.
Id.
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"every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time. 4 Furthermore, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance., 85 She raised the specter of "intrusive post-trial inquiry into
attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation"
affecting counsel's "willingness to serve" and undermining "trust
between attorney and client., 8 6 Finally, "strategic choices made after
thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options
are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less
than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent
that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation.' 8 7
Turning to the prejudice prong, Justice O'Connor wrote that the
"defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. 88 The reviewing court "must
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury., 89 There is
no need for a court to address both prongs or to address them in a
particular order, and "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness
claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed." 90
Mr. Washington lost on both prongs-"a double failure." 9' He had
not shown that the "justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a
breakdown in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in [his]
counsel's assistance" 92 or that his sentencing proceeding was
"fundamentally unfair."
84. Id.at 689.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 690.
87. Id.at 690-91. "And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing
certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." Id. at 691.
88. Id. at 694.
89. Id. at 695.
90. Id.at 697.
91. Id. at 700.
92. Id.Mr. Washington was executed on July 13, 1984. Execution List: 1976 - Present,FLA.
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Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall found the majority opinion
had offered little guidance:
To tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal
defendant must behave "reasonably" and must act like "a reasonably
competent attorney[]" is to tell them almost nothing. In essence, the
majority has instructed judges called upon to assess claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own intuitions
regarding what constitutes "professional" representation, and has
discouraged them from trying to develop more
detailed standards
93
governing the performance of defense counsel.
Having handled death penalty trials and appeals himself, Justice
Marshall was in the unusual position of understanding the unique
responsibilities involved.94
A.

Two Conceptions of Objectivity

In attempting to articulate the meaning of "actual ineffectiveness, ' 9
Justice O'Connor stated at the outset: "The benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result., 96 She
immediately added that this same principle applies to capital
sentencing. 97 She then formulated the two-pronged test that has guided
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence ever since:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
DEP'T CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/oth/deathrow/execlist.html (last visited July 18, 2013).
93. Strickland,466 U.S. at 707-08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
94.

See GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND

Boys, AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 334-46 (2012) (describing Marshall's handling of a
capital rape case in Florida in the early 1950s as director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund); see also JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 14-25 (1994) (describing the history of the

NAACP
95.
96.
97.

Legal Defense Fund, including its capital punishment cases in the pre-Furmanera).
Strickland,466 U.S. at 686 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
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showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction
or death sentence resulted from a98breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.
Prong one required that counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. 99 Justice O'Connor wrote that the
Sixth Amendment "relies instead on the legal profession's maintenance
of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will
fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions.
The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 100 The idea of an
objective standard is central to the Strickland analysis, and it is
important to understand exactly what is meant by objectivity here.
In tort law, where the objective standard of reasonableness
underpins virtually the entire field, objectivity can mean one of two
things: First, it can refer to the defendant's compliance with some
external standard, as distinguished from the defendant acting to the best
of his or her (subjective) ability. This conception of objectivity is
embodied in the classic case of Vaughan v. Menlove,'t ' which held that
the defendant may have been negligent despite having "acted honestly
and bona fide to the best of his own judgment." 10 2 Out of ignorance or
perhaps a cognitive disability,' °3 the defendant failed to realize that
making big piles of rotting hay created a risk of spontaneous
combustion. 0 4 When the resulting fire consumed a neighbor's house, the
defendant was held to the standard of "care taken by a prudent man"
who presumably would have known not to pile up rotting hay.'05
The second sense of objectivity relates to how courts should
ascertain the standard of care taken by a prudent man or, in modern
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
Id. (citation omitted).
(1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.).
Id. at 493.
Vaughan is frequently cited for the proposition that people of below-average intelligence

are still held to the standard of the ordinarily prudent person. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (explaining that "society may

require of a person not to be awkward or a fool").
104.

Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 490.

105. Id.at490,493.
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terms, the reasonable person. Here there are two different ways in which
one can understand the objective standard of care. One possibility is that
the inquiry is strictly empirical or statistical; that is, one can conduct
surveys or otherwise measure what people actually do, with the median
result representing the "reasonable person" standard of care. The
Vaughan case would therefore be analyzed by asking a bunch of farmers
in the surrounding countryside what they do with their hay. Despite the
appeal of this empirical approach, it is not what courts mean by
objectivity. Instead, objectivity connotes a critical normative approach to
setting the standard. 10 6 Courts require legal standards that are capable of
providing guidance in determining liability, but there is a further
rationale behind the objectivity of the negligence standard. Tort law
prescribes the level of care people owe to each other and, as such, is
concerned with normative notions such as rights and responsibilities.
Objective standards establish the level of care someone may be said to
deserve. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s commentary on the
negligence standard is justifiably famous:
If... a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents
and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects
will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less
troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect.

106. One of the most influential articles in tort law, and what is still the starting point for
analysis of these issues today, is Clarence Morris's 1942 article on the role of custom in negligence
law. Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147 (1942). Morris has this to
say about the distinction between the statistical and the normative sense of the objective standard of
reasonableness:
The notion that establishing negligence is only a matter of discovering whether the
defendant departed from customary ways is hard to down, and too often courts have said
or held that conformity to custom is due care. The persistence of the notion that the
ordinarily prudent man, or the man of average prudence, is a composite of actual people
may stem from the ease with which value judgments can be mistaken for statistical
descriptions and vice versa.... In the first sense, a question of ordinary care could be
answered only by finding out what people have done, and by striking a statistical average
for a test. In the second sense a question of ordinary care could be answered only by
deciding what should be expected of the great mass of mankind and by using that
decision as a criterion of satisfactory care. ... But there is a difference. Oft-recurring
behavior is not necessarily satisfactory. We can ill-afford to let those whose interest may
run counter to paying the bill for sufficient, and sometimes expensive, safeguards escape
liability because all of them are guilty of the same shortcomings. While many business
usages are satisfactory, some are not, and we dare not make conformity (average care)
the sole test of satisfactory care.
Id. at 1154-55.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss3/7

18

Stetler and Wendel: The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Representatio

2013]

THE NORMS OF CAPITAL REPRESENTATION

His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up
to their standard ....
The extent of the neighbors' legal protection from accidental fires is
determined by the extent of caretaking courts will deem reasonable. The
ignorant farmer's neighbors demand a certain level of care from him,
because he is in a position to cause them harm if he is careless. The
objective standard of reasonableness is the mechanism by which all of
our rights to physical integrity and the security of our property are
determined. For this reason, courts should look to what actors should do
as opposed to what they sometimes do in fact. Unfortunately, the
Strickland case has led to confusion about the nature of the objective
standard of constitutional effectiveness.
Justice O'Connor's choice of Michel v. Louisiana'0 8 as precedent in
Strickland was foreboding.' 0 9 In Michel, the Court addressed two cases
in which three young African American men had been sentenced to
death for aggravated rape." 0 Each prisoner had challenged the
composition of the grand jury that indicted him, alleging systematic
exclusion of people of color."' The Louisiana state courts found the
challenges waived, because they had not been made before the
expiration of the third judicial day following the end of the grand jury's
term, as required by state statute.'l 2 Only one of the three defendants
(Edgar Labat) had a lawyer who was appointed well before the
termination of the grand jury and his effectiveness was challenged for
failing to raise the issue. 13 The Supreme Court briskly disposed of the
challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel E. I. Mahoney and then
vouched for his competence:
Mr. Mahoney had a reasonable time in which to file his motion to
quash, but did not do so. It was stated on oral argument that he was 76
or 77 years old when he took the case, and was ill in bed during several
months of the year. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
held that the facts did not show a lack of effective counsel .... There is
107.
(1881).
108.
109.
110.

OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1982)
350 U.S. 91 (1955).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
Michel, 350 U.S. at 93.

111.

Id.

112.
113.

Id.
See id. at 95-100.
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little support for the opposite conclusion in the record. Mr. Mahoney
was a well-known criminal lawyer with nearly fifty years' experience
at the bar. There is no evidence of incompetence. The mere fact that a
timely motion to quash was not filed does not overcome the
presumption of effectiveness. The delay might be considered sound
trial strategy .... 14

Mr. Mahoney had been appointed to represent Mr. Labat on January 5,
195 1. 15 As the Court noted: "Thereafter the status of the case remained
unchanged for more than a year. The next entry is dated January 29,
1952, when Mr. Mahoney asked leave to withdraw."'1 16 Successor

114. Id. at 100-01 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The footnote further eulogized trial
counsel as:
an exceptionally qualified counsel. On June 1, 1955, the legal profession in New Orleans
honored him with a plaque which cited him as "an astute and honored criminal lawyer
who has ever been mindful of the oath administered him 52 years ago to uphold the law
and to guarantee to each accused his day in court." As pointed out in the State's brief,
whether or not to make an immediate attack on the grand jury was entirely within the
discretion of Mr. Mahoney and there were valid reasons for not doing so at the time.
Id. at 101 n.7. Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting, with Justice Hugo Black and Chief Justice
Earl Warren, concurring, would have reversed the convictions of Clifton Poret and John Michel to
provide the defendants with "an opportunity to come forward with their evidence that the grand
juries which indicted them were unconstitutional because of the systematic exclusion of Negroes
from the panels." Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted in dissent that thirty-two
percent of the population in Orleans Parish were people of color, but "[o]nly once within the
memory of people living in that parish had a colored person been selected as a grand juror. That
juror, who happened to look like a white man, was selected under the mistaken idea that he was one.
The foregoing facts are not disputed here." Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting). Race permeated these
cases. The trial court "sustained an objection of the district attorney to defense counsel repeatedly
referring to appellant [Michel] in the presence of the prospective jurors as 'this boy"' but found
there was no prejudice because the jury was instructed to determine guilt purely based on the
evidence and the law. State v. Michel, 74 So. 2d 207, 213 (1954). Labat and his codefendant, Poret,
ultimately won relief based on the exclusion of African Americans and "daily wage eamers" from
Orleans Parish jury panels. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 723, 727 (5th Cir. 1966). "Nine times
courts stayed their execution; once, less than three hours before they were to be strapped in the
electric chair." Id. at 701. John Michel, however, was executed on May 31, 1957. See WILLIAM J.
BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 app., at 445
(2d ed. 1984). He appears as "John Joseph Michaels" in the appendix to this reference, based on the
lists originally compiled by Negley K. Teeters and Charles J. Zibulka and later updated by M. Watt
Espy, Jr. Id However, Michel's execution was confirmed by Louisiana researcher Linda
LaBranche, Ph.D., in an e-mail to Russell Stetler on November 8, 2012, based on her research at a
University of Michigan database on June 12, 2000. E-mail from Linda LaBranche, Ph.D., to author
Russell Stetler (Nov. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM) (on file with author and HofstraLaw Review).
115. Michel, 350 U.S. at 100.
116. Id.
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counsel filed a challenge to the grand jury composition, but its term had
already expired a year before."'
B. Reasonablenessand the ABA Guidelines
Justice O'Connor acknowledged the utility of American Bar
Association ("ABA") standards in assessing deficient performance:
Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association
standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1
to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) ("The Defense Function"), are guides to
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular
set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take
account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a
criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the
constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the
wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. Indeed,
the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract
counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the
defendant's cause.118
It is important to focus on Justice O'Connor's concern in this
passage with the independence of the bar. She cautions federal courts
against constitutionalizing standards of practice, not against considering
the Guidelines and other sources of guidance. Various justices have
expressed concern about attempts by the Court to establish norms of
professional conduct in the absence of authority to do so. For example,
Justice William Brennan, concurring in Nix v. Whiteside," 9 emphasized
that the case stands only for the proposition that there was no Sixth
Amendment violation where the lawyer followed the prescriptions of the
then-existing Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility and warned his

117. Id. The critical motion would have required little from Mr. Mahoney. Earlier in the
opinion, the Court had noted that the required motion in Louisiana was "a short, simple document
easily prepared in a single afternoon." Id. at 94. Footnote 2 quoted Michel's four-paragraph motion
verbatim. Id. at 94 n.2.
118. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (citation omitted) (citing ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-4.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]). Justice O'Connor implicitly recognized that these standards were useful

guides even though they were published in 1980-two years after Mr. Washington had been
convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 675, 688.
119. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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client not to testify falsely. 120 Justice Harry Blackmun also concurred
and warned that courts should not involve themselves in the "thomy
problem" of what a criminal defense lawyer should do when faced with
client perjury. 12 1 In both Nix and Strickland, the Court considered
authoritative statements by the profession concerning the duties of
defense counsel and emphasized that these statements, rather than the
Court's own views, ought to determine the standard of competent
representation. Thus, when Justice O'Connor warns against the creation
of "detailed guidelines for representation," ' 122 she isaddressing courts
that may be tempted to second-guess the considered judgment of the
legal profession, not expressing the view that courts should not be
guided by authoritative statements such as the Guidelines, the old Model
Code, or the newer Model Rules.
III.

THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERNAL
DEBATE OVER THE ABA GUIDELINES

A.

The Guidelines as Evidence of the Standardof
Effective Representation

In2000, sixteen years after Strickland, the Supreme Court found
trial counsel ineffective in the preparation of the penalty phase of a death
penalty case for the first time. Writing for the Court's majority
in Williams v. Taylor, Justice John Paul Stevens used the same
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice ("The Defense Function")12 3 that
Justice O'Connor had cited in Strickland in support of the view that it
was objectively unreasonable not to have conducted a thorough
mitigation investigation:
[T]he failure to introduce the comparatively voluminous amount of
evidence that did speak in Williams' favor was not justified by a
tactical decision to focus on Williams' voluntary confession. Whether
or not those omissions were sufficiently prejudicial to have affected
the outcome of sentencing, they clearly demonstrate that trial counsel

120. Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring).
at 177-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
121. Id.
122. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
123. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).
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did not fulfill their obligation24 to conduct a thorough investigation of
the defendant's background.1

A year later, Justice O'Connor voiced her own concern about the
quality of lawyering in capital cases and the risk of wrongful executions.
Addressing the Minnesota Women Lawyers Association on July 2, 2001,
she said, "If statistics are any indication, the system may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed."' 125 She continued,
"Perhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for appointed counsel
in death cases 1and
adequate compensation for appointed counsel when
26
they are used."'

Significantly, it was Justice O'Connor who first cited the
Guidelines. In reversing the death sentence of Kevin Wiggins, she began
by referring to the general ABA defense function standards previously
cited in Stricklandand Williams, noting that trial counsel's conduct "fell
short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the
American Bar Association (ABA)-standards to which we long have
referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable."", 127 She then
acknowledged the specific death penalty guidelines, first published by
the ABA in 1989:
The ABA Guidelines provide that investigation into mitigating
evidence "should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available

mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence
that may be introduced by the prosecutor." ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
11.4.1.(C), p. 93 (1989) (emphasis added). Despite these well-defined
norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner's
background after having acquired only a rudimentary knowledge of his
history from a narrow set of sources. Cf.id., 11.8.6, p. 133 (noting that
among the topics counsel should consider presenting are medical
history, educational history, employment and training history, family
and socialhistory, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and
religious and cultural influences (emphasis added)); 1 ABA Standards
124. Id.at 396 (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 118, Standard 4-4.1
cmt.).
125. Brian Bakst, O'Connor Says There are 'Serious Questions'About Fairness of the Death
Penalty, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J.

(July 3,

2001),

http://Iubbockonline.com/stories/070301/

upd_075-4394.shtml.
126. Id.
127. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and
Williams, 529 U.S. at 396).
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for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1982) ("The
lawyer also has a substantial and important role to perform in
raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to
the court at sentencing .... Investigation is essential to fulfillment of
these functions"). 128
In the Rompilla case in 2005, Justice David Souter, writing for the
Court's majority, discussed multiple iterations of the general ABA
Standards from the early 1980s and the Guidelines, first published by the
ABA in 1989, when explaining why counsel were ineffective for failing
to obtain a court record of a conviction that the prosecutors intended to
introduce as aggravating evidence. He began thus:
The notion that defense counsel must obtain information that the
State has and will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of
common sense. As the District Court points out, the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice in circulation at the time of
Rompilla's trial describes the obligation in terms no one could
misunderstand in the circumstances of a case like this one:
"It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of
the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to
facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event
of conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty."
1 291
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)
The footnote quoted the third edition of the Standards published
in 1993.130

128. Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/Death Penalty-Representation/Standar
ds/National/1989Guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 1989 ABA GUIDELINES). It should be
noted that Justice O'Connor did not hesitate to cite the 1989 Guidelines even though Mr. Wiggins
was tried in that same year. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 514-15.
129. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (footnote omitted) (quoting ABA,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Guideline 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.)).
130. Id. at 387 n.6 (quoting ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Guideline 4-4.1, at 181 (3d ed. 1993)).
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Justice Souter next quoted Wiggins and Strickland on the value of
the ABA Standards as guides to determining what is reasonable,
followed by a lengthy footnote discussing the death penalty guidelines in
considerable detail:
In 1989, shortly after Rompilla's trial, the ABA promulgated a set of
guidelines specifically devoted to setting forth the obligations of
defense counsel in death penalty cases. ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
(1989) (hereinafter 1989 ABA Guidelines or Guideline). Those
Guidelines applied the clear requirements for investigation set forth in
the earlier Standards to death penalty cases and imposed a similarly
forceful directive: "Counsel should make efforts to secure information
in the possession of the prosecution or law enforcement authorities,
including police reports." Guideline 11.4.1.D.4. When the United
States argues that Rompilla's defense counsel complied with these
Guidelines, it focuses its attentions on a different Guideline,
11.4.1.D.2. Guideline 11.4.1.D.2 concerns practices for working with
the defendant and potential witnesses, and the United States contends
that it imposes no requirement to obtain any one particular type of
record or information. But this argument ignores the subsequent
Guideline quoted above, which is in fact reprinted in the appendix to
the United States's brief, that requires counsel to "'make efforts to
secure information in the possession of the prosecution or law
enforcement authorities."'
Later, and current, ABA Guidelines relating to death penalty
defense are even more explicit:
"Counsel must ... investigate prior convictions ... that could be
used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. If
a prior conviction is legally flawed, counsel should seek to have it set
aside. Counsel may also find extenuating circumstances that can be
offered to lessen the weight of a conviction." ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases 10.7, comment. (rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L. Rev.
913, 1027 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
Our decision in Wiggins made precisely the same point in citing the
earlier 1989 ABA Guidelines. 539 U.S., at 524, ("The ABA Guidelines
provide that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise
efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by
the prosecutor"' (quoting 1989 ABA Guideline 11.4.1.C; emphasis in
original)). For reasons given in the text, no such further investigation
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was needed to 3point to the reasonable duty to look in the file in

question here."'

Justice Anthony Kennedy, however, in a dissent joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas,
vehemently disagreed. Justice Kennedy insisted that ABA Standards
are a "useful point of reference," but "'only guides,"' whereas the
majority was "parsing the guidelines as if they were binding statutory
text." 132 Moreover, the majority had overturned a decision by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals that had been written by then Judge Samuel
Alito, 133 who joined the High Court less than a year later, replacing
Justice O'Connor.
B. The Role of PrevailingPractices(or Custom) in
EstablishingStandards of Care
From the analogous perspective of tort law and theory, one can see
that Justice Kennedy is setting up a false dichotomy. Standards need not
34
be either merely a "useful point of reference" or a binding statute.
Instead, there should be a rebuttable presumption that compliance with
authoritative professional standards is required. Courts in torts cases tend
to be skeptical of the defensive use of custom-that is, the argument by
a defendant that, having complied with a prevailing practice in the
industry, it should be deemed for that reason not to have been negligent.
As Richard Posner explains, compliance with custom is not dispositive
of negligence in these cases because an industry may not have an
incentive to take precautions to protect people who cannot bargain
directly with actors in the industry. 35 On the other hand, where "the type
of accident is dangerous only to the industry's customers, the level of
precautions taken by sellers is more likely to be efficient."' 136 Posner then
goes on to explain that courts are more deferential to custom in
professional malpractice cases because "[t]he potential injurers (doctors)
have an incentive independent of the law to provide the level of care for
131. Id.at 387 & n.7 (quoting ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 10.7 cmt., at 1015)
(citing 1989 ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 128, Guideline 11.4.1 .C-D).
132. Id. at 400 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 393 (majority opinion); Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
134. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 400.
135. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.3, at 184-85 (5th ed. 1998).

136. Id.
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which potential victims are willing to pay, because the latter are
customers.' ' 7 Richard Epstein similarly argues that the custom of
practicing physicians is likely to reflect the standard of care that ought to
be enforced, because physicians have numerous incentives not to
provide substandard care to patients: "Physicians and other health care
providers operate under multiple constraints: the glare of publicity when
things go wrong; the censure of their colleagues; peer review; revocation
of hospital privileges; a referral network; licensing; and the pressure to
do a good job when life is on the line."' 138 Of course, even a defendant
represented by a highly skilled lawyer may receive the death penalty, but
there are also numerous instances of lawyers known to be incompetent
who are evidently unaffected by the criticism of their peers or "the
pressure to do a good job when life is on the line."
There is less reason to be tolerant of prevailing practices in an
industry where practitioners do not have similar incentives to deliver
high-quality services -to clients. Virtually all of the considerations
mentioned by Epstein do not apply to the average lawyer in a capital
case. Outside of the rare notorious case, like the sleeping lawyer in
Burdine v. Johnson,'39 there is very little publicity when a capital
defense lawyer is incompetent. Lawyers do not have to worry about
anything like revocation of hospital staff privileges, particularly since
many courts are desperate to maintain a roster of lawyers willing to take
appointed-counsel cases. 140 Referral networks are similarly not an issue
when many lawyers obtain clients by court appointment. Incompetence
alone is hardly ever a ground for professional discipline, because state
137. Id.
138. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 6.2, at 140-41 (1999).
139. 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see also Henry Weinstein, Inmate in
Sleeping-Lawyer Case Pleads Guilty, L.A. TIMES, (June 20, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/
jun/20/nation/na-sleep20.
140. For this reason and the ones noted in the remainder of this paragraph, commentators have
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the mandate of ABA Guideline 3.1 that appointment of
counsel in capital cases be the responsibility of an agency "independent of the judiciary." ABA
GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 3.1, at 944. See, e.g., Ronald J. Tabak, Why an Independent
Appointing Authority Is Necessary to Choose Counsel for Indigent People in Capital Punishment
Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1105, 1105, 1111-12 (2003). Although less frequently addressed by
courts, the Guidelines impose duties, not just on individual lawyers, but also on the states, which
bear the ultimate responsibility for carrying out the commands of the Constitution. See Eric M.
Freedman, Add Resources and Apply Them Systemically: Governments' Responsibilities Under the
Revised ABA Capital Defense Representation Guidelines, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1097, 1102-03
(2003).
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bar grievance committees do not have the resources to investigate and
prosecute negligent lawyers who do not commit some other violation,
such as stealing from clients. 4 ' Censure of one's colleagues is
criminal defense lawyers with
apparently not a concern for the numerous
142
row.
death
on
clients
former
multiple
Criminal defense lawyers may care about their reputation, but often
it is a reputation for qualities other than effective service to their clients.
In a still relevant, famous paper from 1967, sociologist Abraham
Blumberg analogized criminal defense lawyers to double agents who
have to maintain working relationships with regular court personnel (for
example, judges, prosecutors, clerks, and bailiffs) as well as with their
clients.143 The professional performance of defense lawyers depends to a
significant extent upon having a good reputation with judges and
prosecutors. Many lawyers rely on judges to appoint them as defense
counsel. All lawyers need to be able to obtain favorable pleas for their
clients, since so many cases are resolved by plea bargains.' 44 Defense
lawyers need to maintain good relationships on a daily basis with
prosecutors and judges, requiring, above all, a reputation for being
reasonable and not overly aggressive, in order to represent their clients
effectively in the process of negotiating a plea bargain. They have an
incentive to appear to their client as a fierce, zealous advocate for the
interests of the client in that one case but, in addition, they have an
incentive to be cooperative and reasonable with other court personnel
141. See, e.g., Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1695-97 (1994) (arguing that the organized bar lacks the resources to take on
the problem of incompetence through the disciplinary process). In one California case, a lawyer was
suspended for one year after he was held to be ineffective in a death penalty case. See Attorney
Search: Jefferson M. ParrishJr.- #32607, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/
Member/Detail/32607 (last visited July 18, 2013) (listing discipline with actual suspension on June
29, 1990 and eligibility to practice restored on June 29, 1991). But the circumstances of the case
were egregious. Unlike the "sleeping lawyer" in Texas, the California lawyer testified that he was
often up all night during the capital trial. "Specifically, he stated that before and during trial he was
gambling heavily, and may have gambled until 2 or 3 a.m. three or four times during the work week
and three days straight over a weekend without sleeping, and that as a consequence he was not
mentally alert." People v. Ledesma, 729 P.2d 839, 854 (Cal. 1987). Trial counsel admitted accruing
gambling debts of $35,000. Id.Other witnesses also testified to his "compulsive gambling" and use
of methamphetamine ("about $1,500 to $2,000 worth a month"). Id
142. See infra notes 250-60 and accompanying text.
143. See Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptationofa Profession, L. & SOC'Y REV., June 1967, at 15, 28-31.
144. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.").
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across the long run of all of the cases they handle. In the jargon of game
theory, clients are one-shot players and defense lawyers are repeat
players. Thus, defense lawyers may put on a big show of acting
aggressively but, in fact, they are concerned not to be perceived by
judges and prosecutors as unreasonable.
While tort law might defer to prevailing practices-that is,
custom-of practicing physicians, there is considerably less justification
for deferring to the customs of any random roster of court-appointed
lawyers. As the Second Restatement of Torts admonishes courts: "No
group of individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by
adopting careless and slipshod methods to save time, effort, or money, to
set its own uncontrolled standard at the expense of the rest of the
community.', 145 Epstein, in an influential article on the use of custom in
tort law, notes that most industries have an incentive to exercise
reasonable care for the protection of their customers. 46 If riders kept
getting injured at an amusement park or customers frequently got food
poisoning at a restaurant, people would stop going there. In cases
involving informed consumers who have choices about where to do
business, Epstein argues, courts can rely upon "the practices formulated
by those who have powerful incentives to get things right."' 147 Tort duties
to customers may therefore generally follow industry custom. The
situation is very different in stranger cases where potential victims
cannot bargain with those who may harm them and cannot demand
additional care to be taken. In those cases, the custom of the industry
does not reflect what informed consumers would bargain for in terms of
safety. "Short of liability, the railroads have little incentive to take into
account the injuries suffered by small children who play about their
turntables.' 4 8 Thus, custom should not be used in stranger cases; it has

145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (1965). In Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining
Co., the court noted:
If the defendants had proved that in every mining establishment that has existed since the
days of Tubal-Cain, it has been the practice to cut ladder-holes in their platforms,
situated as this was while in daily use for mining operations, without guarding or lighting
them, and without notice to contractors or workmen, it would have no tendency to show
that the act was consistent with ordinary prudence.
Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100, 112 (1884).
146. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in
the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-10 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, The TJ.Hooper].
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 20.
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the effect of ratifying the slipshod practices of those who lack incentives
to get things right.
For this reason, Epstein argues for strict liability in
149
cases.
stranger
One of the principal insights of viewing the Guidelines through the
lens of tort law is that the background to their development resembles a
stranger case much more closely than a customer case. Reliance on
custom makes sense where similarly situated parties have, over a series
of repeated interactions, been able to propose and bargain over their
respective legal rights and duties, including how much care is to be
taken for one another's well-being. 50 Even in an employment setting,
sometimes taken as an instance of unequal bargaining power, some
employers may find themselves in a competitive market and will have an
incentive to offer a safe workplace as a means of attracting and retaining
employees.' 5 ' One can hardly imagine a less suitable case than capital
defense representation for the application of a consensual, bargainingbased, "customer" account of reliance on industry custom. Many capital
defendants lack the capacity to engage meaningfully at all with their
appointed counsel, let alone to bargain effectively for additional
protection. 15 Mistrust is pervasive in criminal defense representation,
with defendants often viewing their lawyers (sometimes not
unreasonably) as part of the institutional mechanism that is trying to put
them in prison or the death chamber.153 Many criminal defendants would
149. Id. at 17-20. Another way to understand the relationship between a criminal defendant and
defense counsel is a situation in which only one of the parties, the lawyer, can take precautions.
Economic theorists of tort law advocate for strict liability in these "unilateral care" situations. Mark
F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 887, 893 (1994).
150. Epstein, The TJ. Hooper,supranote 146, at 9-12.
151. Id. at 22. The railroad case described by Epstein was decided before the widespread
adoption of workers' compensation statutes, which preempted common law tort causes of action
brought by employees arising out of injuries in the workplace. See id. at 17. Nevertheless, it is a
useful example because it is a sympathetic explanation for the court's reliance on custom in what
seems to be a rather Dickensian environment. The point of the citation is that the case for the
reliance on custom in the capital defense representation context is even less persuasive than in the
workplace.
152. Indeed, the commentary to ABA Guideline 10.5 advises that "the prevalence of mental
illness and impaired reasoning is so high in the capital defendant population" that counsel should
assume the client to be "emotionally and intellectually impaired."' ABA GUIDELNES, supranote 1,
Guideline 10.5 cmt., at 1007 & n.178.
153. See, for example, People v. Huffman, 71 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977), where the
court rejected:
a claim of inadequacy of counsel by public defender who (1) did not voir dire the jury,
(2) made no objection to any evidence during the presentation of the prosecution's case,
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hardly know what highly skilled legal representation consists of, so they
would not have any idea what terms to seek in a bargain with their
lawyer. Clients also reasonably believe that their lawyers are ethically
obligated to provide effective representation, quite apart from what
agreement they make with their clients about the quality of
representation to provide.
Guidelines prepared by impartial experts accordingly offer two
benefits. They indicate what quality of representation a competent
professional ought to provide, without deferring to the standards of
practice (for example, custom) of lawyers who may have incentives that
work against the provision of high-quality client service.I5 4 In addition to
(3) made no opening statement, (4) cross-examined no prosecution witnesses, (5)
presented no evidence on behalf of the defendant, and (6) waived argument to the jury.
Id. at 265-66. The California Court of Appeals memorably quotes the defendant saying, "I need a
lawyer, not a dump truck."' Id. at 270. The Court then explained:
For the benefit of the uninitiated, "dump truck" is a term commonly used by criminal
defendants when complaining about the public defender. The origins of the phrase are
somewhat obscure. However, it probably means that in the eyes of the defendant the
public defender is simply trying to dump him rather than afford him a vigorous defense.
It is an odd phenomenon familiar to all trial judges who handle arraignment calendars
that some criminal defendants have a deep distrust for the public defender. This erupts
from time to time in savage abuse to these long-suffering but dedicated lawyers. It is
almost a truism that a criminal defendant would rather have the most inept private
counsel than the most skilled and capable public defender. Often the arraigning judge
appoints the public defender only to watch in silent horror as the defendant's family,
having hocked the family jewels, hire a lawyer for him, sometimes a marginal misfit
who is allowed to represent him only because of some ghastly mistake on the part of the
Bar Examiners and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Superior Court ....
Id. at 267 n.2; see also ROBERT HERMANN, ERIC SINGLE & JOHN BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR:
CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN URBAN AMERICA 156-57 (1977) (explaining that study obtaining data from
Los Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C. found pervasive antipathy of unexpected magnitude
toward publicly paid defense lawyers, especially those in defender offices); Jonathan D. Casper, Did
You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender., YALE REV. L. & Soc.
ACTION, Spring 1971, at 4, 6. Client distrust of lawyers paid from public funds poses acute
problems in capital cases because of the need to conduct mitigation investigations which invade the
most sensitive areas in a client's life and plea discussions that typically require clients to agree to a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See Russell Stetler, Commentary on Counsel's
Duty to Seek and Negotiate a Disposition in Capital Cases (ABA Guideline 10.9.1), 31 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1157, 1162-64 (2003) (discussing barriers to trust and strategies for building relationships of
trust). On the other hand, a recent survey by RAND researchers found that, regardless of clients'
beliefs, public defenders in Philadelphia obtained significantly better results than court-appointed
private counsel in homicide cases: compared to appointed counsel, public defenders reduced their
clients' murder conviction rate by nineteen percent and lowered the probability that their clients
would receive a life sentence by sixty-two percent. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much
Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122
YALE L.J. 154, 159 (2012).
154. See, e.g., ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 1.1, at 919 (explaining that the
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improving the quality of standards, guidelines have the potential of
improving compliance with standards. 5 The New Yorker writer Atul
Gawande has discussed the importance of checklists in aviation and
medicine. 156 The role of checklists in aviation is not to establish a new
standard of care which pilots had previously not complied with; rather, it
is to ensure that in a high-workload environment full of distractions,
vital steps in a process are not overlooked.' 57 Giving greater effect to the
Guidelines may help focus the attention of lawyers on aspects of the
representation they may have missed due to a deadline or the press of
other business. Capital defense attorney David Bruck has developed a
checklist-based approach to the Guidelines, acknowledging that they are
long and complex but arguing that, as in medicine and aviation,
complexity may be managed for the benefit of others with discipline and
attention to procedures. 55 Bruck's checklist addresses a variety of
common problems. For example, sometimes the court has approved
funding for two seemingly qualified lawyers, a fact investigator, and a
mitigation specialist, but the team exists only on paper because it does
not meet regularly, communication is inadequate, and the lawyers do not
sufficiently value the contributions of the non-lawyers. 59 Another
common problem arises when lawyers try to handle too many cases. 160 A
objective of the Guidelines "is to set forth a national standard of practice for the defense of capital
cases in order to ensure high quality legal representation").
155. See Grady, supra note 149, at 897-98 (illustrating, in terms of negligence, the distinction
"between the quality and the rate of precaution").
156. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 32-47
(2009).
157. Tragic commercial aviation accidents have been attributed solely to the failure of the
flight crew to perform an essential step in a process, such as selecting the appropriate flap setting for
takeoff. See, e.g., NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT, at i-ii
(1988),
available at http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR8805.pdf (reporting on the crash of Northwest Airlines flight 255 on August 16, 1987 at the Detroit
Metropolitan Wayne County Airport). There was some evidence that the crew was simply having an
"off day," and the first officer may have been distracted by other duties at the moment he ordinarily
would have set the flaps for takeoff. Id. at 59-60. The crash, which killed 154 people on the plane
and two on the ground, would almost certainly have been prevented by the use of the taxi/pretakeoff checklist. Id. at ii, 68.
158.

DAVID BRUCK, THE ABA

GUIDELINES BOILED DOWN

1-4

(2010), available at

http://www.sites.melcooper.com/acdia/death/leboeuf/leboeuf abaguidelines boiled down_ 1 .pdf.
159. See id.at 6-7; see also Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 913 (N.D. Iowa
2012) (finding ineffective assistance in penalty phase in a section 2255 case despite what the district
court "believed was a 'dream team' of three lawyers, an investigator, a mitigation specialist, and
multiple mental health experts when they failed to function as a team).
160. See BRUCK, supranote 158, at 6-7.
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dysfunctional team is no more effective than a lawyer with no team at
all, and a lawyer with too many cases simply cannot devote the time
required for quality representation.
As a result, the Guidelines are most usefully understood not as a
quasi-statutory source of binding duties, or as merely another data point
in the analysis of objectively reasonable representation, but as a
presumptive source of guidance for courts and lawyers. If, as the law and
economic analysis predict, capital defense lawyers had sufficient
incentives to provide high-quality legal services to their clients in most
cases, then it would be reasonable for courts to defer to professional
custom in setting the standard of constitutional effectiveness. As Epstein
notes, however, "The entire debate is over the question of the rate of
convergence" between professional custom and what is actually required
by an objective standard of reasonableness. 161 There seems to be little
doubt that the rate of convergence in capital defense is far from ideal,
and that many lawyers deliver careless and slipshod service in far too
many cases. In light of this divergence, the Supreme Court ought to be
looking to a source of norms that is clear, reliable, stable, and informed
by significant professional expertise. Unfortunately, the Court has been
inconsistent in its use of the Guidelines. In the last two per curiam
decisions finding trial counsel ineffective in capital cases, Porter v.
McCollum and Sears v. Upton, the Court conspicuously omitted explicit
reference to the ABA standards and guidelines. 162 Both cases allude to
counsel's "obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the
defendant's background,"' 163 citing to Williams v. Taylor at the very
point where the ABA was mentioned in that opinion. 164
Meanwhile, in a per curiam opinion denying an ineffectiveness
claim in Bobby v. Van Hook,165 the Court chastised the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals for misusing the Guidelines in two ways. 166 The Court
continued to agree that "[r]estatements of professional standards.., can
be useful as 'guides' to what reasonableness entails, but only to the
161. See Epstein, The T.J. Hooper,supranote 146, at 24.
162. See Sears v. Upton, 130 S. Ct. 3259 (2010) (per curiam); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S.
30 (2009) (per curiam).
163. Sears, 130 S. Ct. at 3265 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Porter, 558 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396.
165. 558 U.S. 4 (2009) (per curiam).
166. Id. at 8.
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extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the
representation took place.' '167 The Court asserted that the Sixth Circuit
had simply judged old conduct by newly published norms: "Judging
counsel's conduct in the 1980s on the basis of these 2003 Guidelineswithout even pausing to consider whether they reflected the prevailing
professional practice at the time of the trial-was error.'' 168 Furthermore,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had (again) parsed the Guidelines like
binding statutory text: "To make matters worse, the Court of Appeals
(following Circuit precedent) treated the ABA's 2003 Guidelines not
merely as evidence of what reasonably diligent attorneys would do, but
as inexorable commands .... 169 No other justice joined a vitriolic
concurrence by Justice Alito, in which he asserted that the Guidelines
had no "special relevance" to Sixth Amendment performance
standards. 70 He dismissed the ABA as "a private group with limited
membership," not reflecting the views of the American bar as a whole
and thus not meriting a "privileged position" in determining the
obligations of a capital defense attorney. 1

167. Id. at 7.
168. Id. at 8. Of course, five years earlier, the Court had cited the 2003 Guidelines when
denying relief in Floridav. Nixon, assessing trial performance in 1985. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S.
175, 190-91 (2003).
169. Bobby, 558 U.S. at 8. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has also used the
language of obligation and command. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.7 (2005)
(explaining that Guideline 11.4.1.D.4 "requir[es]" counsel to obtain information in possession of
prosecution and law enforcement); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (explaining defense counsel's
"obligation to conduct a thorough [background] investigation").
170. Bobby, 558 U.S. at 13-14 (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 14. The relevant criterion of reliability is not whether some percentage of lawyers
belongs to the ABA but whether the process by which the ABA constitutes a study and drafting
committee is likely to produce a document that reflects the considered judgment of lawyers with
expertise in the issues considered. By analogy, suppose the American College of X Physicians-fill
in any medical specialty-had a membership comprising only twenty-five percent of physicians
who practice in that area. Suppose further that this association has a tradition of consulting with
academic and practicing physicians with excellent reputations, spending as much time and effort as
necessary to study issues thoroughly, and of producing reports and recommendations that are
influential in the community of practitioners. The relatively low percentage of physician members
seems much less important than the expertise of committee personnel, the study and drafting
process, and the reception of the association's reports in the professional community. The processes
of drafting the Guidelines and the Supplementary Guidelines conform closely to this hypothetical.
They are described respectively in the Introduction and Acknowledgements in ABA GUIDELINES,
supra note 1, at 915-16, and in Sean D. O'Brien's article, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary
Guidelinesfor the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV.693, 697-702 (2008).
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As the Court's criticism of the Sixth Circuit in Bobby shows, courts
should not assume that the Guidelines translate into constitutional
standards in all respects. They are evidence of what reasonable lawyers
would do, but they are not necessarily conclusive or even presumptive
evidence. (Procedurally speaking, this means they do not shift the
burden to the respondent to disprove ineffectiveness, but they do satisfy
the petitioner's burden of production on the element of error.) In this
respect, the Guidelines are similar to the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("MIRPC") and the versions of the Model Rules
adopted by state courts. The Scope section at the beginning of the
MRPC disclaims any intention by the ABA to create implied civil rights
of action for the violations of the rules, but it notes that "since the Rules
do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a
Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standards of
conduct." 172 There is nothing inappropriate about using ethics rules
promulgated by the profession as a source of guidance in evaluating the
conduct of lawyers. 73 Accordingly, the plaintiff in a civil malpractice
action is generally required to introduce expert testimony to establish the
standard of care. An expert may rely on disciplinary rules as evidence of
the standard of care, but the ultimate inquiry is always whether the
attorney's conduct satisfied the standard of skill and 174
knowledge
ordinarily possessed by lawyers under similar circumstances.
The modifier, "under the circumstances," which is part of the
reasonableness inquiry throughout tort law, suggests that the Sixth
Circuit in Bobby may have erred in judging past conduct according to
more recently published standards. In Bobby, however, the record did
not disclose whether an expert would have testified that a reasonable
lawyer in the 1980s would have done what the 2003 Guidelines
required-not because the conduct was required by the Guidelines, but
because reasonable lawyers under the circumstances in the 1980s would
have done something which the ABA only subsequently got around to
codifying in the Guidelines. 175 The inquiry in Sixth Amendment
ineffectiveness cases, just as in civil tort actions, is whether a lawyer
behaved reasonably. It is important to resist the temptation to
172.
173.
174.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Scope [20] (2003).
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6, at 52 (1986).
See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 20:7, at 1353-54

(2009).
175. See Bobby, 558 U.S. at 7-8 (majority opinion).
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oversimplify this inquiry. As discussed previously, prevailing custom
does not necessarily establish what is reasonable. As Bobby shows,
merely citing the Guidelines is also insufficient to establish
reasonableness. The standard of reasonableness in capital defense
representation, like all normative standards in tort law, is a subject
for critical, reflective analysis by courts, informed by the judgment
of lawyers with the relevant expertise, training, and judgment. The
judgment of experts may be, in turn, informed by professional
standards, statements, scholarship, amici curiae, and other authoritative
sources of guidance.
IV.

JUSTICE STEVENS'S GUIDANCE: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY

Fortunately, in Padilla v. Kentucky, 176 Justice John Paul Stevens
offered a more evenhanded approach when addressing prevailing norms
in a noncapital case involving the "collateral" consequences of a
criminal conviction arising from bad advice from a criminal defense
lawyer.1 77 Jose Padilla faced deportation after relying on his trial
lawyer's erroneous advice when pleading guilty to drug charges that
made his deportation virtually mandatory. 178 The Kentucky Supreme
Court "held that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from
erroneous advice about deportation because it is merely a 'collateral'
consequence of his conviction."' 179 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and disagreed in Padilllav. Kentucky. 8 °
Writing for the Court's majority, Justice Stevens provided
a succinct tutorial on how to assess the objective test of
deficient performance:
Under

Strickland, we

first

determine

whether

counsel's

representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."
Then we ask whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." The first prong-constitutional deficiency-is
necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008)).
Id.at 1477 & n.1.
Id. at 1478 (citing Padilla,253 S.W.3d at 483).
Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1478.
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community: "The proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." We long
have recognized that '[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in
American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides
to determining what is reasonable. . ... ' Although they are 'only

guides,' and not 'inexorable commands,' these standards may
be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of
effective representation ....181
Justice Stevens went on to discuss how "[t]he weight of prevailing
professional norms supports the view that [criminal defense] counsel
must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.' 82 He then
enumerated a long list of contemporaneous supporting authorities,
including: Performance Guidelines for Criminal Representation
published by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (1995);
books on plea bargaining (1997), the law of sentencing (2004), and the
criminal defense of immigrants (2003); a law review article (2002); and
an article from The Champion, the monthly magazine of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (2007).183 He also quoted
favorably from the Brief for Legal Ethics, Criminal Procedure, and
Criminal Law Professors as amici curiae: "[A]uthorities of every
stripe-including the American Bar Association, criminal defense and
public defender organizations, authoritative treatises, and state and city
bar publications-universally require defense attorneys to advise as to
the risk of deportation consequences for non-citizen clients .... ,,1 84
Justice Stevens's comprehensive list provides useful guidance for
identifying the equivalent authorities in the context of capital defense.
V.

THE EVOLUTION OF NORMs REFLECTED IN THE
(EVOLVING) ABA GUIDELINES

The need for thorough investigation of both guilt and penalty issues
has been apparent throughout the era of the modem, post-Furman death
penalty. When the ABA published the second edition of its Standards
for Criminal Justice in 1980, Standard 4.4-1 described the duty of
181. Id. at 1482 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S.
Ct. 13, 16-17 (2009) (per curiam), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).
182.
183.

Padilla,130 S. Ct. at 1482.
Id. at 1482-83.

184. Id. at 1482 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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defense counsel to investigate as follows: "It is the duty of the lawyer to
conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to
explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and
the penalty in the event of conviction."185 The commentary to this
Standard noted concisely, "Facts form the basis of effective
representation."'' 86 In discussing mitigation, the commentary continued,
"Information concerning the defendant's background, education,
employment record, mental and emotional stability, family relationships,
and the like, will be relevant, as will mitigating circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense itself."' 87 These ABA
Standards were cited by Justice Stevens in Williams v. Taylor in
reference to counsel's obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of a
8
capital defendant's background.1
These ABA Standards covered criminal defense generally.
Discussions of capital defense provided more specific detail about
counsel's duties in investigating mitigating evidence. As early as 1979,
Dennis N. Balske (a capital-defense litigator then practicing in the
South) emphasized, "Importantly, the life story must be complete.' ' 189 In
1983, Professor Gary Goodpaster discussed in another widely circulated
law review article trial counsel's "duty to investigate the client's life
history, and emotional and psychological make-up" in capital cases.' 90
He wrote:
There must be inquiry into the client's childhood, upbringing,
education, relationships, friendships, formative and traumatic
experiences, personal psychology, and present feelings. The
affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life will be composed in
part of information uncovered in the course of this investigation. The

185. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 118, Standard 4-4.1 (emphasis added).
186. Id. Standard 4-4.1 cmt.
187. Id.; see also Joseph B. Cheshire V, Ethics and the Criminal Lawyer: The Perils of
Obstruction of Justice, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 12, 12 ("Defense counsel have a right and a
duty to approach and interview every witness that might have any information regarding the
particular issue involved in their client's case.").
188. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000).
189. Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV.
331, 357-58 (1979).
190. Gary Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 323-24 (1983).
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importance of this investigation, and the thoroughness
and care with
191
which it is conducted, cannot be overemphasized.
Writing in The Champion in 1984, Mr. Balske advised capital defense
counsel that they "must conduct the most extensive background
investigation imaginable. You should look at every aspect of your
client's life from birth to present."' 9
At the beginning of the 1980s, a capital defense lawyer in
California hired a former New York Times reporter to investigate the life
history of his client. The reporter, the late Lacey Fosburgh, had
previously written Closing Time: The True Story of the "Goodbar"
Murder-a best-selling book about a murder case she had covered for
the newspaper. 193 After her successful work in developing the capital
client's mitigation evidence, Ms. Fosburgh wrote about the critical role
she had played:
[A] significant legal blind spot existed between the roles played by the
private investigator and the psychiatrist, the two standard informationgetters in the trial process. Neither one was suited to the task at hand
here-namely discovering and then communicating the complex
human reality of the defendant's personality in a sympathetic way.
Significantly, the defendant's personal history and family life, his
obsessions, aspirations, hopes, and flaws, are rarely a matter of
physical evidence. Instead they are both discovered and portrayed
through narrative, incident, scene, memory, language, style, and even a
whole array of intangibles like eye contact, body movement, patterns
of speech-things that to a jury convey as much information, if not
more, as any set of facts. But all of this is hard to recognize or develop,
understand or systematize without someone on the defense team
having it as his specific function. This person should have nothing else

191. Id.at 324 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court recognized very early that
penalty cases, "Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance [was
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
192. Dennis Balske, The Penalty Phase Trial: A Practical Guide, CHAMPION, Mar.

in death
already]
(1982).
1984, at

40, 42; see also Robert R. Bryan, Death Penalty Trials: Lawyers Need Help, CHAMPION, Aug.

1988, at 32, 32 ("There is a requirement in every case for a comprehensive investigation not only of
the facts, but also the entire life history of the client."); Stebbins & Kenney, supra note 50, at 18
("The capital defense attorney must recognize that the profession demands a higher standard of
practice in capital cases ....
").
193. LACEY FOSBURGH, CLOSING TIME: THE TRUE STORY OF THE "GOODBAR" MURDER
(1977).
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to do but work with the defendant, his family, friends, enemies,
business associates and casual acquaintances, perhaps even duplicating
some of what the private detective does, but going beyond
that and
194
looking for more. This takes a lot of time and patience.
Capital defense counsel across the country soon recognized the
value of non-lawyers with expertise in the development of mitigating
evidence-ultimately referred to as "mitigation specialists."1' 95 The
California defense bar prominently featured one such non-lawyer on the
cover of its monthly magazine Forum (published by California
Attorneys for Criminal Justice) in 1987.196 The accompanying interview
described how the mitigation investigator is "[d]ifferent from an
investigator in that the whole emphasis on what I do has to do with the
social and psychological factors in a person's life-their biographical
history."' 197 A mitigation consultant from New Jersey appeared on the
magazine's cover the following year. 198 She had co-authored an article in
The Champion in 1986 discussing how forensic social workers could
enhance capital defense. 199 The following year, another article in
the national defense-bar monthly commented tersely, "The mitigation
specialist is a professional who, as attorneys across the nation are
now recognizing, should be included and will be primary to the
defense team."200
In 1998, a committee of federal judges examining costs of the
federal death penalty noted that "[t]he work performed by mitigation
specialists is work which otherwise would have to be done by a lawyer,
194. Lacey Fosburgh, The Nelson Case: A Model for a New Approach to Capital Trials,
Forum, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 31, 32 (emphasis added); see also Michael G. Millman, Interview:
Millard Farmer,FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1984, at 31, 31-33; Team Defense Project, Team Defense in
Capital Cases, FORUM, May-June 1978, at 24, 24.
195. SUBCOMM. ON FED. DEATH PENALTY CASES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION sec. I(B)(7) (1998) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING

DEFENSE REPRESENTATION],
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
uncategorized/DeathPenaltyRepresentation/Standards/National/federaljudicial_conference-reco
mmendations.authcheckdam.pdf (commonly known as "the Spencer Report").
196. Anne E. Fragasso, Interview: Casey Cohen, FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 22, 26.
197. Id.
198. Leslie H. Abramson, Interview: Cessie Alfonso, FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 24, 26.
199. Cessie Alfonso & Katharine Bauer, EnhancingCapitalDefense: The Role of the Forensic
ClinicalSocial Worker, CHAMPION, June 1986, at 26, 26-29.
200. James Hudson et al., Using the Mitigation Specialist and the Team Approach, CHAMPION,
June 1987, at 33, 36.
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rather than an investigator or paralegal., 20 1 Their report noted that
mitigation specialists "have extensive training and experience in the
defense of capital cases. They are generally hired to coordinate an
investigation of the defendant's life history, identify issues requiring
evaluation by psychologists, psychiatrists or other medical professionals,
and assist attorneys in locating
experts and providing documentary
20 2
materials for them to review.,

In an affidavit detailing the professional norms existing at the time
of a defendant's trials in 1987 and 1990, Russell Stetler explained:
The 1989 edition of the ABA Guidelines reflected a national consensus
among capital defense practitioners based on their practices in the
1980s. These Guidelines were the result of years of work by the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) to develop
standards to reflect the prevailing norms in indigent capital defense.
NLADA published its Standards for the Appointment of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases ...in 1985. With initial support from

the ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
(SCLAID), NLADA developed its expanded Standards for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases

...over

the course of several years. In February 1988, NLADA

referred the Standards to SCLAID, which reviewed them and
circulated them to appropriate ABA sections and committees. SCLAID
incorporated the only substantive concerns expressed (by the
Criminal Justice Section) and changed the nomenclature to
"Guidelines" as more appropriate than "Standards." Each black-letter
guideline was explained
by a commentary, with references to
2 3
supporting authorities.

0

The revision of the Guidelines in 2003 reflected the evolution of
national capital defense practice in the 1990s. The revised Guidelines
emphasized that lead counsel at any stage of capital representation (trial
or post-conviction) should assemble a defense team as soon as possible
after designation with at least one mitigation specialist and at least one
member qualified by training and experience to screen individuals for
201. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, supra note 195, at sec.
I(B)(7).
202. Id.; see also Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned ifYou Do, Damned if You Don 't: The Use of
Mitigation Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM J. CRIM. L. 359, 364 (1997) ("[L]aw school

prepares one to be an advocate, not an investigator.").
203. Affidavit of Russell Stetler at 14, Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 1299001) (citations omitted).
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the presence of mental or psychological disorders or impairments 2 4 in
order to conduct a thorough and independent investigation relating to
penalty.2 °5 The original edition of the Guidelines, adopted in 1989, had
simply advised counsel to begin investigation immediately upon
counsel's entry into the case and to "discover all reasonably available
to
mitigating evidence., 20 6 The 1989 Guidelines also advised counsel
20 7
retain experts for investigation and "presentation of mitigation.,
VI.

APPELLATE COURTS NEVER SEE CAPITAL

CASES THAT

AVOID THE DEATH PENALTY

On April 9, 2001, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg vented her
frustration about the quality of trial representation in the capital cases
that ultimately reach the High Court: "I have yet to see a death case,
among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execution
[stay] petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at trial. 20 8
Following her speech, Justice Ginsburg added that "People who are well
represented at trial do not get the death penalty., 20 9 A corollary of
Justice Ginsburg's observation is that the Justices-and, for that matter,
most of the appellate judges as well-never see capital cases that have
been well litigated and avoided a death sentence. As we will see in Part
VIII, the vast majority of death-eligible cases do not end in
death sentences.
On the post-Furman Court, only Justice Marshall brought the
personal experience of representing capitally charged clients at trial and
in post-conviction proceedings. 210 But even he had never prepared for
the penalty phase of a bifurcated proceeding. Few judges anywhere on
the federal bench have done so. One of the rare exceptions, Judge Helen
G. Berrigan of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Louisiana, had worked as a volunteer lawyer in jurisdictions where
204.

ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 10.4, at 999-1000.

205. Id. Guideline 10.7, at 1015.
206. 1989 ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 128, Guideline 11.4.I(C).
207. Id. Guideline 11.4.1 (D)(7).
208. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Supreme Court Justice, address to the University of the District of
Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law, Joseph L. Rauh Lecture: In Pursuit of the Public Good:
Lawyers Who Care (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/
viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-09-Ola.html.
209.

Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBS NEWS

(Feb.

11,

2009, 9:27

AM),

http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-508 162-284850.html.
210. See KING, supranote 94, at 338-42.
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resources were scarce or nonexistent. She offered this candid selfdescription when she published an article entitled The Indispensable
Role of the Mitigation Specialist in a Capital Case: A View from the
FederalBench:
The author, as a lawyer, handled the penalty phase of a number of
capital cases in the 1980s and early 1990s on a pro bono basis. She
had never heard of a mitigation specialist. She did her own
investigation and she attributes what success she had largely to
extraordinary luck, time-consuming
doggedness, and a sunny, non211
threatening demeanor.

Unfortunately, some jurists in the appellate realm seem to assume
that the cases that come before them constitute the relevant universe
defining prevailing practices. The Court's analysis in Cullen v.
Pinholster212 provides a perverse illustration of this fallacy. Scott
Pinholster was tried in Los Angeles in 1984.13 His trial counsel called
only one witness in the penalty phase, Mr. Pinholster's mother, while the
prosecution called eight witnesses to testify about past threats and
violent behavior.2 14 Trial counsel moved to exclude the prosecution
witnesses for lack of notice, but the motion was denied after a hearing.2 15
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, viewed counsel as employing a
sound strategy:
[I]f their motion were denied, counsel were prepared to present only
Pinholster's mother in the penalty phase to create sympathy not for
Pinholster, but for his mother. After all, the "family sympathy"'
mitigation defense was known to the defense
bar in California at the
2 16
time and had been used by other attorneys.

In support of the dubious proposition that the "family sympathy"
mitigation defense was "known to" the California defense bar, Justice
Thomas transformed two largely irrelevant and patently unsuccessful
cases into a putative standard. He cited the dissent of Chief Judge Alex

211. Helen G. Berrigan, The IndispensableRole of the Mitigation Specialist in a Capital Case:
A View from the FederalBench, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 819, 819 n.*(2008).
212. 131 S. Ct. 1380 (2011).
213. Id.at 1395, 1407.
214. Id. at 1396.
215. Id. at 1395.
216. Id. at 1404 (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

43

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:635

Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.21 7 Chief Judge Kozinski,
21 8
in turn, cited two cases, both of which also ended in death sentences.
On closer inspection, we find that neither case relied on only one
mitigation witness, as Mr. Pinholster's counsel attempted to do. Both
cases involved multiple mitigation witnesses.219 In addition, one
involved a lawyer who had never handled a penalty phase before
or successfully used "family sympathy" for anything relevant to any of
his cases.22 °
One case had nothing explicitly to do with "family sympathy"
mitigation. In the sentencing phase of Kevin Cooper's trial (moved from
San Bernardino to San Diego County on change of venue), "The defense
presented several friends and relatives of defendant who testified about
his good qualities and their continuing love for him., 221 The jury was
expressly not permitted to consider the impact his execution would have
on his family members. 222 The other case, involving John Louis
Visciotti, was tried in Orange County, California and did involve the
"family sympathy" strategy. 223 However, Mr. Visciotti's counsel had
never tried a capital case to a jury before or handled a penalty phase.224
He did not investigate Mr. Visciotti's family: because they were paying
his bill.225 The California Supreme Court found that "in none of [defense
counsel's] self-described successful presentations of a family sympathy
defense in prior cases was family sympathy evidence relevant to any
issue in the case and in none could the effort be accurately described as
'successful.', 226 Trial counsel's belief in this defense theory apparently
arose from media coverage of a noncapital drug case he had heard about:
The other basis for counsel's hope that family sympathy might sway
the jury was his belief that, in a widely reported case in which [trial
counsel] had no involvement, a jury acquitted the defendant of a
217. Id. (citing Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 707 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting)).
218. Pinholster, 590 F.3d at 707 (citing People v. Cooper, 809 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1991), and In re
Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987 (Cal. 1996)).
219. In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d at 993; Cooper, 809 P.2d at 880.
220. In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d at 993.
221. Cooper, 809 P.2d at 880.
222. Id. at 908.
223. In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d at 993.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 990, 993-94.
226. Id. at 993.
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narcotics-related charge and in doing so was influenced to accept an
entrapment defense by the loyalty displayed
by the defendant's wife
227
who was regularly in attendance at the trial.
In Mr. Pinholster's case, Justice Thomas also blamed the dissent
(by Justice Sonia Sotomayor) for offering no evidence of a different
standard. He averred that the dissent:
cites no evidence ... that such an approach [i.e., the family sympathy

defense] would have been inconsistent with the standard of
professional competence in capital cases that prevailed in Los Angeles
in 1984. Indeed, she does not contest that,228at the time, the defense bar
in California had been using that strategy.
Of course, Justice Sotomayor was in no better position than any of the
other Justices to know what the prevailing norms were. She, too, had
seen only the unsuccessful cases which reached the Court because death
sentences had been imposed.
The problem with appellate judges drawing conclusions based upon
the small universe of cases over which they have presided is increasingly
well understood by psychologists who study judgment and decisionmaking. It is not a problem specific to judges but one that affects all
humans due to our cognitive makeup. To put it very plainly, the trouble
is that people are simply not very good intuitive scientists. 229 They tend
to rely on unconscious, intuitive shortcuts (known as heuristics), which
most of the time work fairly well. 230 Heuristics allow us to make fast,
effortless decisions, thereby conserving cognitive resources for tasks that
demand effortful reflection. 23' Unfortunately, heuristics also lead to
certain predictable errors. Consider, for example, the availability
heuristic.232 If asked to estimate the likelihood of a hurricane or an act of
227. Id.
228. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011).
229.

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 112-13 (2011).

230. See id at 97-99.
231. See id
232. See MAx H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 18-19 (2009);
KAHNEMAN, supranote 229, at 81; RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 24-26 (rev. ed. 2009); see also Thomas

Gilovich & Dale W. Griffin, Judgment and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 542 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010). The paper by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, which was a significant basis for Kahneman's recent Nobel Prize, is reprinted in
Kahneman's book, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1984), reprinted in KAHNEMAN, supra
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terrorism, most people will come up with a number that is greatly in
excess of the actual risk.233 The reason is that certain events are highly
"available" to our intuitive processing system, meaning that it is easy to
call examples to mind.234 Just the word "terrorism" conjures an
immediate association with images of the burning World Trade
Center towers. Because it is easy (in fact, unconscious and effortless) to
recall an example of an event, people tend to overestimate the likelihood
of its occurrence.235
Related to the availability heuristic is the problem of confirmation
2
3
bias. 6 Once we have an idea in mind, we tend to seek out-again,
without being aware we are doing so-evidence that tends to confirm
our belief and ignore evidence that tends to disconfirm it. 237 This is the
case even though, logically speaking, disconfirming evidence provides
2 38
much more reliable information regarding the reliability of a belief.
Due to the unconscious nature of this effect, we sometimes do not
realize that seemingly logical reasoning is in fact the product of an
unconscious mechanism that seeks to defend beliefs already arrived at
through another unconscious process. A striking demonstration of this
tendency, which has obvious implications for this Article, is a study in
which participants were asked to review evidence for and against the
deterrent effect of the death penalty. 9 Participants who had previously
identified themselves as supporters of the death penalty judged evidence
against its deterrent effect to be unpersuasive.24 ° What is more, they
were able to concoct a seemingly logical explanation based on
methodological flaws they perceived in the studies.241 Of course,
opponents of the death penalty reached exactly the opposite conclusion
and had mirror-image objections to studies purporting to show the
effectiveness of the death penalty at deterring crime.242 People do not
note 229, at 419, 425-47 (discussing the availability heuristic in more detail).
233. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 229, at 419,425.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Gilovich & Griffin, supranote 232, at 546.
237. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of Prior
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099
(1979).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2
,2102 & tbl.1.
241. Id. at2103 tbl.2.
242. Id. at2102 &tbl.1.
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review evidence rigorously as a statistician would; rather, they reach
conclusions based on unconscious processes and then become very
resistant to disconfirming evidence.243
Based on this research, it is apparent that a judge who sees only
lousy performances by lawyers is likely to overestimate their prevalence.
Cases in which a capital defendant was well-represented often result in
either a favorable plea deal or a sentence less than death. Naturally
enough, those cases do not result in appeals in which the performance of
counsel at sentencing is evaluated by an appellate court. Judges are
therefore trying to infer a conclusion about what good lawyers should
do, based on a sample of cases handled badly. It would be virtually
impossible, in those circumstances, for a judge to reach a conclusion that
is reliable. Appellate judges considering direct appeals and collateral
review proceedings are already dealing with a biased sample, but in
addition, they encounter the availability heuristic. It is easier to think of
an example of a massive screw-up by a lawyer-because it is dramatic
and memorable-than to recall an instance of excellent representation.
Thus, judges tend to overestimate the frequency with which lawyers
make mistakes. In the case described above, the Justices offered
conjectures back and forth concerning the prevalence of the use of the
"family sympathy" defense by lawyers in California. 244 Given the small
sample size and the availability of the case before them, however, it is
highly unlikely that they would have been able to reach a reliable
conclusion on the issue of whether this defense was in line with the
practices of reasonable professionals. More reliable evidence could have
come from an expert who could testify about a number of cases based on
a careful statistical analysis or from decisions of professional standardsetting institutions such as the ABA, which are in a better position to
make an objective assessment.
243. A well-known paper by Tom Gilovich of the Cornell University Psychology Department
and his colleagues showed that, despite the ardent belief of basketball fans, there is no such thing as
a player having a "hot hand." Thomas Gilovich et al., The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the
Misperception of Random Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL, 295, 313 (1985). That is, players
who have recently made a series of field goals or free throws are not any more likely to make the
next shot. Id at 309. Gilovich and his co-authors reached this conclusion after studying thousands
of sequences of shots, and no one has ever shown the study to be flawed. See id. at 304-05.
Nevertheless, no less an authority than former Boston Celtics coach Red Auerbach reacted angrily
to the study, saying: "Who is this guy? So he makes a study. I couldn't care less." KAHNEMAN,
supra note 229, at 116-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
244. See supranotes 212-17 and accompanying text.
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QUANTITY OF EXPERIENCE DOES NOT

NECESSARILY ESTABLISH COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS

One of the critical revisions of the Guidelines in 2003 addressed the
issue of capital defense counsel's qualifications in a new way. The
original edition in 1989 included Guideline 5.1-Attorney Eligibilityand specified elaborate quantitative qualifications. 245 Lead trial counsel
assignments, for example, were to be distributed to practitioners with
"at least five years litigation experience in the field of criminal
defense," 246 and:
prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine jury trials of
serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, as well as
prior experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in at least one case in
which the death penalty was sought. In addition, of the nine jury trials
which were tried to completion, the attorney should have been lead
counsel in at least three cases in which the charge was murder or
aggravated murder; or alternatively, of the nine jury trials, at least one
was a murder or aggravated murder trial and an additional five were
felony jury trials ....

247

Practitioners realized, however, that there were many individuals
who met these nominal criteria but whose performance consistently fell
below the norms of the capital defense community. Many individuals
with heavy capital caseloads did not attend regular training. They
managed their caseloads poorly, and they dispatched their clients to
death row with regularity. An influential essay by a leading capital
defense lawyer made the point succinctly: "Standards for the
appointment of counsel, which are defined in terms of number of years
in practice and number of trials, do very little to improve the quality of
representation since many of the worst lawyers are those who have long
taken criminal appointments and would meet the qualifications. 2 48
In 2010, journalist Adam Liptak wrote about one such overworked
trial lawyer in Texas:
A good way to end up on death row in Texas is to be accused of a
capital crime and have Jerry Guerinot represent you.
245. 1989 ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 128, Guideline 5.1.
246. Id. Guideline 5.1(A)(ii).
247. Id. Guideline 5.1(A)(iii).
248. Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Notfor the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1871 n.209 (1994).
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Twenty of Mr. Guerinot's clients have been sentenced to death.
That is more people than are awaiting
249 execution in about half of the 35
states that have the death penalty.
The lawyer did not respond to Liptak's messages seeking comment, but
he had previously told a London newspaper that "judges only gave him
tough cases., 250 He told that newspaper, "The easy ones, somehow,
never came to me .... I think it's a recognition that if I represent them,

the state is in for one hell of a fight. Nothing goes down easy.", 251 Liptak
cited an analysis in the Houston Chronicle in 2009 that found that the
lawyer "had represented 2,000 felony defendants in 2007 and 2008-far
above the caseload limits recommended by bar associations and other
groups that take criminal defense work seriously. 2 52 There is no doubt
that the Texas lawyer was experienced, but grave doubt remains about
his skills, knowledge, commitment, and performance.
Wyoming has had only six death sentences in the post-Furman
era, 253 but four of the six prisoners were represented at trial by the same
public defender.254 All of his capital trials ended in death sentences. 5
The Los Angeles Times published a feature story about a Long
Beach, California attorney who had had eight clients sentenced to death,
noting, "That is a Death Row record no prosecutor can match....
Some
256
lawyers joke that he has his 'own wing' at San Quentin.,
A column in the PhiladelphiaInquirer focused on one recent case
but described the woeful performance of "court-appointed lawyers who

249. Adam Liptak, A Lawyer Known Best for Losing Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2010, at Al3.
250. Id.
251. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Id.
253. Osborne v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 614 (10th Cir. 1988); Eaton v. State, 2008 WY 97,
1, 192 P.3d 36, 49 (Wyo. 2008); Harlow v. Murphy, No. 05-CV-39-B (D. Wyo. Feb. 15, 2008);
Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 1, 67 P.3d 536, 546 (Wyo. 2003); Engberg v. Meyer, 802 P.2d 70, 73
(Wyo. 1991); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 47 (Wyo. 1983).
254. See Engberg, 820 P.2d at 118; Hopkinson, 664 P.2d at 78; Reply Brief of the Appellant at
3 n.1,
Eaton v. State, 192 P.2d 36 (Wyo. 2008) (No. 04-180); Michael L. Rehberg, Court Filed
Expert Resume at 39, Freeman v. Busch, 199 F. Supp. 2d 907 (2002) (No. Civ.1-99-CV-10063).
255. See generally Testimony of Wyatt Skaggs in Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing vol. 1,
Wyoming v. Eaton, 2008 WY 97, 192 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2008) (Nos. 04-180, 06-255) (discussing
counsels representation of death-penalty defendants and their sentences).
256. Ted Rohrlich, The Case of the Speedy Attorney, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at Al ("Some
defense attorneys take months to try capital cases; this one is known to spend a few days, or less.").
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have represented scores of other indigent defendants.
summarized the court record as follows:

' 57

The column

There isn't a single motion filed by the attorneys in defense of their
client. Nor is there a request for a jury questionnaire, which is standard
in most jurisdictions that regularly handle capital cases, or for a
mitigation specialist to prepare a case against the death penalty.
Indeed, the only motion in the record was handwritten by the
defendant. Prison logs indicate that his lawyers visited him a total of
three times.258
In 2003, Guideline 5.1 of the Guidelines was revised to eliminate
quantitative measures altogether and to stress instead commitment to
high-quality representation and special skills and knowledge relevant to
capital cases. 259 The Commentary to Guideline 5.1 notes that:
the abilities that death penalty defense counsel must possess in order to
provide high quality legal representation differ from those required in
any other area of law. Accordingly, quantitative measures of
experience are not a sufficient basis to determine an attorney's
qualifications for the task. An attorney with substantial prior
experience in the representation of death penalty cases, but whose past
performance does not represent the level of proficiency or commitment
necessary for the adequate representation of a 26
client
in a capital case,
0
should not be placed on the appointment roster.
VIII.

THE MAJORITY OF CAPITAL CASES

AVOID THE DEATH PENALTY
There is no nationwide database that tracks all the potential death
penalty cases pending in the trial courts across the country. Even
statewide tracking of capital cases is rare because few of the death
penalty jurisdictions have established agencies that are funded to
discover this information and have statutory authority to obtain it. New
York State was an exception. The legislation that enacted the death
257. Marc Bookman, Op-Ed., No Dangerof Excess Justice, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr, 5, 2012, at
A23. An e-mail from Mr. Bookman to Russell Stetler on November 12, 2012 disclosed that one of
the lawyers in the case already had two other clients on death row. E-mail from Marc Bookman,
Exec. Dir., Atlantic Ctr. for Capital Representation, to author Russell Stetler (Nov. 12, 2012, 4:57
PM) (on file with author and Hofstra Law Review).
258. Bookman, supra note 257, at A23.
259. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 5.1, at 961-62.
260. Id. Guideline 5.1 cmt., at 963-64.
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penalty in New York in 1995 also created a Capital Defender Office
("CDO") with a mandate to ensure that capitally-charged defendants
received effective representation.2 61 Prosecutors were required to notify
the CDO whenever anyone was arrested for first-degree murder.26 2 Such
defendants were then eligible for capitally qualified counsel (either staff
attorneys from the CDO or private attorneys who had received
specialized training through the CDO) unless and until the prosecution
advised the court on the record that death had been precluded as a
potential punishment.263
New York's post-Furman experiment with a death penalty system
began on September 1, 1995, and effectively ended on June 24, 2004,
when the state's highest court found the statute unconstitutional.264
While the statute was operational, 877 defendants were charged with
potential death-eligible offenses, entitling them to capitally qualified
counsel. 265 The statute imposed a deadline of 120 days after arraignment
in the trial court for prosecutors to decide whether they would actually
seek to impose the death penalty in the individual case.266 Over ninety
percent of the cases were decapitalized (for example, prosecutors elected
to seek life without parole, rather than the death penalty, as the
maximum punishment), and only fifty-eight went forward as death
penalty prosecutions. 267 Many oof those cases were still resolved by
negotiated disposition, including two that were resolved after conviction

261. 1995 N.Y. Laws 16-17.
262. Id. at 17-18.
263. Id. at 16-19; see also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b (McKinney 2002).
264. People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 365 (N.Y. 2004) (holding unconstitutional state
deadlock instruction as creating substantial risk of coercing jurors into sentencing a defendant to
death for fear that court would impose a parole-eligible sentence in the event of failure to reach
unanimity in the penalty phase); N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, THE DEATH PENALTY tN NEW YORK 1415 (2005), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf. The
court's decision left the remainder of the statute intact and would have permitted the Legislature to
correct the statutory infirmity. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 344. Instead, the State Assembly held five
public hearings conducted by its standing committees on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction from
December 15, 2004 through February 11, 2005. N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, supra, at 1-3. The
Legislature took no steps toward correcting the statutory infirmity, and the death penalty was no
longer operational. See id. at 1.
265. These statistics were maintained by the New York State Capital Defender Office and
reported by former capital defender Kevin M. Doyle in an e-mail to Russell Stetler on October 17,
2012. E-mail from Kevin M. Doyle to author Russell Stetler (Oct. 17, 2012, 5:37 PM) (on file with
author and Hofstra Law Review).
266. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 250.40(2) (McKinney 2004).
267. E-mail from Kevin M. Doyle to Russell Stetler, supranote 265.
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in the trial court.268 Only seven death sentences were imposed (and all of
them were ultimately overturned). 269 By any calculus, the vast majority
of cases did not end in death sentences.
Funding cuts have prevented any agency from continuing to track
all of the death penalty cases in California, but in the early post-Furman
years the Office of the State Public Defender did track all cases in order
to make reliable forecasts of its own appellate caseload.27 ° Cases were
tracked from the introduction of the new death penalty statute in 1977
through December 31, 1989 (the very period in which the Pinholster
case, discussed in Part VI, was tried in Los Angeles).27 1 Over ninety
percent of potential capital cases avoided the death penalty: 3425 cases
were filed, but only 319 death sentences were imposed statewide (9.3
percent). 272 In Los Angeles, 1711 cases were filed, with only ninety-nine
death sentences imposed (5.7 percent).27 3
The Committee on Defender Services of the Judicial Conference of
the United States created a Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty
Cases, chaired by the Honorable James R. Spencer. 274 The
subcommittee's initial report was issued in May 1998, and its

268. The two cases that were resolved after first-degree murder convictions in the trial court
were in Kings County. People v. Page, 785 N.Y.S.2d 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (affirming
judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County); People v. Bonton, No. 4152/98, 1999 WL
33313135 at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 6, 2006), aff'd 775 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(affirming defendant's conviction and subsequent waiver of right to appeal in exchange for life
imprisonment). The Jermaine Page plea was reported by Joseph P. Fried, Brooklyn Killer Takes
Deal for Life in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1988, at B8. Jerry Bonton's plea was reported by
Mike Claffey, Killer Chooses Life Over Death in Plea Agreement, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12,
2000, at 3.
269. Six death sentences were overturned by the New York Court of Appeals. See People v.
Taylor, 878 N.E.2d 969, 984 (N.Y. 2007); People v. Shulman, 843 N.E.2d 125, 140 (N.Y. 2005);
People v. Mateo, 811 N.E.2d 1053, 1083 (N.Y. 2004); LaValle, 817 N.E.2d at 368; People v. Cahill,
809 N.E.2d 561, 594 (N.Y. 2003); People v. Harris, 779 N.E.2d 705, 728-29 (N.Y. 2002). The case
of the remaining death-sentenced prisoner, Nicholson McCoy, was resolved following the LaValle
decision. See Robert Gearty & Bill Hutchinson, Sentenced to Life, Killer Yawns, DAILY NEWS, Sept.
10, 2004, at 7; William Glaberson, Across New York, a Death Penalty Stuck in Limbo, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2004, at Al.
270. See CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT: INVESTIGATING HABEAS CORPUS CLAIMS (1994)
(providing county breakdown of death penalty cases based on data compiled by the Office of the
State Public Defender) (on file with authors and HofstraLaw Review).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. The number of penalty trials statewide was 675; the number in Los Angeles was 220.
Id.
274. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING DEFENSE REPRESENTATION, supra note 195.
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recommendations were adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United
States on September 15, 1998.275 An update released in September 2010
provided data on federal capital defendants during the period from 1989
to 2009.276 The update noted that the data employed "should be viewed
as a good estimate," rather than a precise count, but also that the
numbers are conservative in the sense that they count only death-eligible
cases that were actually or likely to be filed in federal court:
In this report, the term "death-eligible" refers to a case that is expected
to be or already has been filed in federal court and in which at least one
count of the indictment alleges or is expected to allege an offense for
which the death penalty is a possible punishment. It is essential to note
that such federal death-eligible cases do not constitute the entire
universe of "potential" federal death penalty prosecutions. Rather,
these death-eligible federal cases are themselves the result of a
selection process. As a jurisdictional matter, most federal death penalty
cases could be prosecuted in either federal or state court. Federal
authorities, often in consultation with state law enforcement agencies,
determine whether and where to bring the prosecution, a decision that
may turn on any one of a number of factors. This research has found
no source from which the number of all
such potential federal death
277
penalty cases can readily be ascertained.
The

update identified 2975

"death-eligible"

federal capital

defendants from 1989 through 2009,278 and found that the Attorney

General authorized 463 of those cases to proceed capitally. 279 By the end
of 2009, 262 authorized defendants had been tried, and sixty-eight of
those who proceeded to trial were sentenced to death. 280 Thus, threequarters of the defendants in authorized cases avoided the death penalty
at trial. Others avoided the death penalty through plea bargains. 28 1 A

275. JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES,
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION
IN FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY
CASES
1 (2010), available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FederalDPCost20l 0.pdf.
276. Id at4&5fig.1.
277. Id. at 4 & n.6.
278. Id. at 5 fig. 1 ("'Death-Eligible' Federal Capital Defendants, 1989-2009, by Calendar Year
of Indictment.").
279. Id. at 8 fig.2 ("U.S. Department of Justice Capital Authorizations, 1989-2009, by Year of
Authorization.").
280. Id. at 8-10.
281. Id at9n.14.
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scant two percent of the "death-eligible" federal defendants received the
death penalty.282
Professor John J. Donohue III, a lawyer and economist at Stanford
University, published a comprehensive review of the application of the
death penalty in Connecticut from 1973 to 2007.283 He found that out of
4686 murders in the sample period, there were 205 death-eligible cases
that resulted in a homicide conviction, of which 138 were charged with a
capital felony. 284 Of the 138 capitally charged cases, forty-six defendants
were permitted to plead guilty to a noncapital offense. 285 Sixty-six of
the remaining ninety-two were convicted of a capital felony and twentysix were acquitted of capital felony charges. 286 Of those sixty-six
defendants convicted of a capital felony, twenty-nine proceeded to a
death penalty sentencing hearing, resulting in nine sustained death
sentences and one execution.28 7
For most death penalty jurisdictions, it is difficult to find reliable
statistics comparable to those we have just discussed. The statistical
snapshots that can be found are for the most part in academic and
journalistic studies focused on other issues, such as the impact of race
and geography, relative rates of judge and jury death sentencing, and
comparison of military and civilian systems. The datasets in these
snapshots are not uniform. Statutes vary in terms of death eligibility,
notice requirements, eligibility for capitally qualified counsel, etc. Even
the seemingly simple task of counting the number of death sentences
imposed requires metric conventions about how to count the outcomes
of resentencing proceedings. The number of "cases" sometimes refers to
trials, rather than defendants. Nonetheless, even with all of their
limitations, the available studies consistently indicate that most deatheligible cases avoid death sentences.

282. Id. at 5 fig.1, 10.
283. John J. Donohue III, Capital Punishment in Connecticut, 1973-2007: A Comprehensive
Evaluation From 4686 Murders to One Execution 1 (2011), available at http://works.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1095&context-john donohue.
284. Id.
285.

Id.

286. Id.
287. Id. The only prisoner executed in Connecticut was Michael Ross, who waived his appeals.
Ross v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), stay denied, 544 U.S. 1028 (2005). There
were no involuntary executions prior to abolition of the death penalty in that state in 2012.
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A study by reporters for the Atlanta Journal-Constitutionexamined
murder convictions in Georgia from 1995 to 2004,288 including 1315
cases eligible for the death penalty.289 Prosecutors sought the death
penalty in roughly one-fourth of these cases (344).290 Most were
then resolved by plea agreements, but 127 went to trial and fifty-seven
defendants received death sentences (including eight whose cases were
overturned and who were not resentenced to death). 29' Thus, death
sentences imposed represented 44.8 percent of the cases that went to
trial (57 of 127), 16.5 percent of the cases where prosecutors
sought death (57 of 344), and 4.3 percent of the death-eligible cases
(57 of 1315).
An analysis by the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense
Services of all potentially capital cases with warrant dates after July 1,
2001 found that "over 83 percent ended in a conviction of second degree
murder or less; over 12 percent ended in a voluntary dismissal, no true
bill, or no probable cause finding; and 45 percent ended in a conviction
of less than second degree murder., 292 For "proceeded capital cases"
(where the prosecution pursued the death penalty at some point), "60
percent ended in a conviction of second degree murder or less; 22
less than second degree murder; and 3
percent ended in a conviction of 293
verdict.,
death
a
in
ended
percent
The South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense opened a
Capital Trial Division in September 2008.294 According to data compiled
by that office, forty-four death penalty cases (trials, retrials, or
resentencings) were closed between September 2008 and October 16,
2012, resulting in six death sentences imposed by a jury and one by a

288.
Sept. 23,
289.
290.
291.
292.

Bill Rankin et al., A Matter of Life or Death: Death Still Arbitrary, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
2007, at Al.
Id.
Id.
See id.
N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FY07 CAPITAL TRIAL CASE STUDY, at 11 (2008),

at
http://www.ncids.org/Reports%20&%20Data/Latest%20Releases/FY07
available
CapitalStudyFinal.pdf.
293. Id. at I-II. For the first time since the death penalty was reinstated in 1977, there were no
new death sentences in North Carolina in 2012. Anne Blythe, No One Sentenced to Death in North
Carolina this Year, NEWS OBSERVER, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/ll/

09/2473276/no-one-sentenced-to-death-in-north.html
294. E-mail from Natasha J. Holliday, Capital Trial Div., S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def., to
author Russell Stetler (Oct. 16, 2012, 10:33 AM) (on file with author and Hofstra Law Review).
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judge (death sentences in about sixteen percent of authorized cases). 295 A
review of cases litigated before the Capital Trial Division opened looked
at the wider pool of cases that were potentially death-eligible under the
broad South Carolina statute.296 Using "court files, contemporary news
accounts, and other publicly available information" to profile 151
homicides in Charleston County between 2002 and 2007, the researchers
found "l15-fully 76 percent-involved facts that would support the
existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance sufficient to
render them eligible for the death penalty, but only 5 (4.3 percent) were
actually prosecuted as death penalty cases-with 1 resultant death
sentence. 29 7 They found similar results in Richland County: 117 cases
prosecuted capitally out of 152 potentially eligible cases-again with a
single death sentence.298 The researchers also found that the State sought
death sentences in 226 cases statewide from 1995 to 2007.299 They
looked closely at 124 cases from the counties that produce the greatest
number of death sentences and found death verdicts in only nine of
the 124 cases.30 0
Another study analyzed all murder indictments in Kentucky
between December 22, 1976 (the effective date of the capital statute) and
October 1, 1986, and identified 864 cases resulting in murder
301
convictions. Prosecutors pursued capital punishment at some point in
557 cases but only 104 went to trial in front of death-qualified juries,
with 35 death sentences imposed.30 2
Based on an analysis of 3442 murders and non-negligent homicides
during the years 2001 through 2010, the Indiana Public Defender
Council could not determine "how many of these homicides were
295. Id. That office represented twenty-four of the forty-four defendants, only one of whom
received a death sentence. Id.
296. John H. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back: South Carolina's Return to the
Unconstitutional,StandardlessCapital Sentencing Regime of the Pre-FurmanEra, 4 CHARLESTON
L. REv. 479, 494-98 (2010) [hereinafter Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back].
297. Id. at 499 & n.87.
298. Id. at 500; E-mail from Emily C. Paavola, Capital Trial Div., S.C. Comm'n on Indigent
Def., to author Russell Stetler (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:59 AM) (on file with author and Hofstra Law
Review).
299. Blume et al., When Lightning Strikes Back, supranote 296, at 531.
300. Id; E-mail from Emily C. Paavola to Russell Stetler, supra note 298.
301. Gennaro F. Vito & Thomas J. Keil, Capital Sentencing in Kentucky: An Analysis of the
Factors Influencing Decision Making in the Post-Gregg Period, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
483, 494-95 (1988).
302. Id. at 495.
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eligible for a death penalty request, meaning that 1 or more of the 16
aggravating circumstances could be alleged and the defendant was 18 or
older," but concluded, "Prosecuting attorneys actually requested the
death penalty in 38 of these homicides, 9 of the cases proceeded to a
capital trial, and 6 actually resulted in death sentences. 3 °3
The Missouri Department of Corrections published sentencing data
for first-degree murder cases from Fiscal Year 1990 through Fiscal Year
2006, showing eighty-seven death sentences imposed compared to 714
sentences of life without parole (meaning 10.9 percent of cases ending in
death sentences).30 4
The late Professor David C. Baldus and his colleagues analyzed the
185 prosecutions of death-eligible offenders in Nebraska from 1973 to
19 9 9 .305 They found that death was waived by the State in over half of
the cases (96 of 185).306 Of the remaining eighty-nine (forty-eight
percent) that proceeded to a penalty trial, only twenty-nine resulted in
death sentences (about one-third of the cases that proceeded to trial, or
about sixteen percent of all the death-eligible cases).30 7
A study of death sentencing from 1980 through 1999 in Colorado
identified 110 defendants against whom the death penalty was sought. 0 8
Thirty-seven of the 110 cases went to a penalty phase, but the sentencing
authority (judge or jury) imposed death sentences on only thirteen of the
defendants (11.8 percent).3° 9
A study in New Mexico identified 211 death penalty cases filed
from July 1, 1979 through December 31, 2007, of which 203 had been
concluded. 310 Nine cases were dismissed before trial; almost half (47.8
percent) were resolved with a plea bargain that precluded a death
303. Death Penalty Facts, IND. PUB. DEFENDER COUNCIL 4-5, http://www.in.gov/ipdc/generaU/
indianadpfactsheet.pdf (last updated Apr. 1, 2013).
304.

Mo. DEP'T OF CORR., A PROFILE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL AND SUPERVISED OFFENDER

POPULATION ON JUNE 30, 2006, at 47 (rev. ed. 2007) ("Capital Punishment: Awaiting Execution,
Executions, and Sentences for Murder 1st Degree FYI 990-FY2006").
305. David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Legal and EmpiricalAnalysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB.
L. REV. 486, 545 fig.1 (2002).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Stephanie Hindson et al., Race, Gender, Region and Death Sentencing in Colorado,
1980-1999, 77 COLO. L. REv. 549, 572 (2006).
309. Id. at 573.
310. Marcia J. Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979
Through December 2007: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 38 N.M. L. REV. 255, 266 (2008).
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sentence; 46.9 percent went to trial. 311 Roughly twenty-five percent of
the concluded cases proceeded to a penalty phase, and juries returned
fifteen death sentences (7.11 percent of the 211 cases).312
In a study funded by the state of Maryland, criminologist Raymond
Paternoster and his colleagues identified 1311 cases eligible for
the death penalty from 1978 to 1999 (out of nearly 6000 first- and
second-degree murder cases), with death sentences imposed in seventysix cases.3 13
Even in Delaware, which has a high death-sentencing rate in
relation to the number of murders, the most comprehensive study found
a total of forty-nine death sentences in Delaware since 1972, resulting
from 138 trials and resentencings, including defendants who had more
than one trial or sentencing.31 4
The majority of death-eligible cases under the military capital
punishment system have also avoided death sentences. A study by
Professors Catherine M. Grosso, David C. Baldus, and George
Woodworth found that 104 death eligible cases for murder committed by
United States military personnel were prosecuted from 1984 through
2005, resulting in the imposition of fifteen death sentences.31 5
One additional dataset illustrates how the overwhelming majority of
cases in which appellate and habeas corpus courts found reversible error
resulted in sentences less than death on retrial. In 2000, Professors James
S. Liebman and Jeffrey Fagan and doctoral candidate Valerie West
published a massive study in which they examined error rates in 4578
311.

Id.

312.

Id

313. Raymond Paternoster et al., Justice by Geography and Race: The Administration of the
Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978-1999, 4 MARGINS 1, 18-20 (2004).

314. Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., The Delaware Death Penalty:An EmpiricalStudy, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 1925, 1938 & n.70 (2012); E-mail from John H. Blume to author Russell Stetler (Oct. 29,
2012, 4:30 PM) (on file with author and the Hofstra Law Review). The authors note that prior
studies had revealed that, in relation to the number of murders, Delaware has the third-highest death
sentencing rate in the United States. Johnson et al., supra, at 1928 (citing John Blume et al.,
Explaining Death Row's Population and Racial Composition, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165,

172 (2004)).
315. Catherine M. Grosso et al., The Impact of Civilian Aggravating Factors on the Military
Death Penalty (1984-2005): Another Chapter in the Resistance of the Armed Forces to the

Civilianization of Military Justice, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 570 (2010). Most of the military
death sentences have been overturned. As of January 1, 2013, there were only five prisoners on the
military death row. NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROJECT, DEATH Row
USA:
WINTER 2013,
at 62,
available at http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/

DRUSA Winter_2013.pdf.
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state capital cases for the period 1973 to 1995.316 They found that the
overall rate of prejudicial error was sixty-eight percent.3 17 Of those
whose capital judgments were overturned, eighty-two percent received
a sentence less than death when the case was remanded to the
trial court. 318 In fact, "7 percent were found to be innocent of the
capital crime. 3 19
The five cases overturned by the Supreme Court for failure to
investigate mitigation thoroughly provide further support for the
proposition that effectively litigated cases are likely to avoid death
sentences. Four of the five individuals subsequently received sentences
of less than death, and one case is pending as of this writing. Terry
Williams received a life sentence by negotiated disposition in Danville,
Virginia in 2000.320 On October 15, 2004, the State of Maryland agreed
to a disposition sending Kevin Wiggins to a state facility for mental
health treatment and rehabilitation services but making him eligible for
parole immediately based on time already served.32' On August 13,
2007, the Lehigh County, Pennsylvania District Attorney's Office
stipulated to a life sentence for Ronald Rompilla.32 2 On July 21, 2010,
the Brevard-Seminole, Florida State Attorney's Office announced that it
would allow George Porter, Jr., to be resentenced to life because of his
age (seventy-eight), stating "if we were to seek and obtain [the death
penalty], it would never be executed. 323
Finally, continuing reports from trial courts across the country in
cases involving highly aggravated murders and horrendous loss of life
demonstrate that death sentences are never automatic or inevitable.
High-profile examples include the cases of Lee Boyd Malvo, the so316. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995
(Colom. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 15, 2000), available
at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cftn?abstract-id-232712.
317. Id. at68.
318. Id. at ii.
319. Id. (emphasis omitted).
320. See Frank Green, Death Penalty Cases Scrutinized. More Hearings Are Being Ordered in
Virginia, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2001, at Al.

321. See 12 Year Battle for Kevin Wiggins Comes to an End, JENNER & BLOCK LLP (Oct. 15,
2004), http://jenner.com/library/news/7810.
322. See Death Row Inmate Gets New Life Term, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2007, 11:06 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-13-477084247_x.htm.
323. Kaustuv Basu, Aging Killer May Get Reprieve from Death Row, FLA. TODAY (July 21,
2010, 10:47 AM), http://www.floridatoday.com/article/20100721/NEWS01/7210344/Aging-killermay-get-reprieve-from-death-row.
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called "Beltway Sniper"; 324 Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth
hijacker of the September 11th attacks; 325 Terry Nichols, tried twice (in
federal and then state court) for the Oklahoma City bombing; 326 and
Brian Nichols (convicted of killing a judge, a court reporter, a deputy,
and a U.S. Customs agent during his escape from an Atlanta courthouse
hearing on other charges).32 7 More mundane examples occur week after
week in courtrooms across the country as jurors choose life sentences for
serial killers, cop killers, child killers, and others guilty of the most
reviled and abhorrent crimes. 328 While concerns about wrongful
324. Sniper Malvo Sentenced to Life Without Parole, CNN (May 5, 2004, 7:22 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/03/10/sniper.malvo/.
325. See Jerry Markon & Timothy Dwyer, JurorsReject Death Penaltyfor Moussaoui, WASH.
POST, May 4, 2006, at Al.
326. See Tim Talley, Religion Creditedin Nichols Jury's Choice, WASH. POST, June 13, 2004,
at A12; see also Tony Clark, Nichols Gets Life for Oklahoma Bombing, CNN (June 4, 1998, 8:39
PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9806/04/nichols.update.pm/index.html.
327. See Expensive Death Penalty Prosecutionof Infamous MurdererResults in Lite- WithoutParole Sentence in Georgia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
expensive-death-penalty-prosecution-infamous-murderer-results-life-without-parole-sentencegeorgia (last visited July 18, 2013); see generally Brian Rankin, The Nichols Case: Failure to Win
Death Penalty Resonates, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 14, 2008 (discussing the death penalty in the
wake of the Nichols case); Steve Visser & J. Scott Trubey, Nichols Gets Life Without Parole,
ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 13, 2008 (reporting on the sentence imposed on Nichols).
328. See United States v. Bass, 460 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (imposing life sentence on
defendant for four drug-related murders); United States v. Beckford, No. 97-4924, 211 F.3d 1266, at
*4 (4th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (Westlaw) (imposing life sentence on defendant for six drug-related
murders); United States v. Johnson, 219 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2000) (imposing life sentence on
defendant for five drug-related murders); United States v. Pitera, 5 F.3d 624, 625 (2d Cir. 1993)
(imposing life sentence on defendant for seven drug-related murders in which the victims were
tortured and their bodies dismembered); United States v. Williams, No. 00 Cr. 1008, 2011 WL
3296101, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011) (imposing life sentence on defendant for execution-style
triple murder); United States v. Kehoe, No. 4:97-CR-00243-(1), 2008 WL 4079316, at *2 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 28, 2008) (imposing life sentence on defendant for murdering two adults and a small
child); United States v. Moore, No. 00-157-2, 2005 WL 6797098, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005)
(imposing life sentence on defendant for thirty-one drug related murders); United States v. Edelin,
134 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2004) (imposing life sentence on defendant for fourteen drugrelated murders); Carol D. Leonnig, 2 Top Bosses of 'Murder Inc.' Get Life Terms, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2005, at B 1; Carol D. Leonnig, D.C. GangLeader Blames System for Crime, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2004, at B4; see also United States v. Gilbert, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-3 (D. Mass Mar. 26,
2001) (imposing life sentence on a Virginia nurse who murdered four patients and attempted to
murder three others); United States v. Al-'Owhali, 691 F. Supp. 2d 441, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(imposing life sentence on defendant for involvement in the terrorist bombing at American
embassies that killed 224 people); Phil Hirschkom, FourEmbassy Bombers Get Life, CNN (Oct. 21,
2001), http://www.edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/I9/embassy.bombings; see, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL CALLS: A REVIEW OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS' MANAGEMENT OF INMATE
TELEPHONE PRIVILEGES, (1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/9908/callsp51 .htm

(reporting on the case of Anthony Jones, who was sentenced for life for six drug-related murders);
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convictions have dramatically altered the public policy debate on capital
punishment, mitigation evidence has continued to bring life sentences
even in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. 32 9 The rarity of
death sentences is a fact that the Supreme Court has recognized in
assessing the relative severity of life without parole sentences for
juveniles and adults. 330 As the quality of capital defense representation
increases and the number of death sentences imposed annually
diminishes, courts may find it increasingly difficult to "indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance" in the tiny minority of cases ending
in a sentence of death.33'
IX.

CONCLUSION

Counsel's duty to conduct thorough mitigation investigation in
death penalty cases must be understood in terms of the evolving
standards of the specialized capital defense bar-a bar that has been
increasingly successful in avoiding death sentences. The Guidelines are
well-established as the best starting point for counsel and courts
attempting to understand what these standards are. The commentary to
the Guidelines is encyclopedic, providing support from case law, books
and treatises, law review articles, defense bar publications, and training
materials for all the black letter Guidelines.3 32 The Supplementary
Guidelines, in turn, provide detailed elaboration of the norms specific to
cf United States v. Alexis Candelario Santana, Crim. No. 09-427, 2013 WL 101615, at *2 (D.P.R.
Jan. 8, 2013) (imposing life sentence on defendant for "La Tombola Massacre" in which eight
people were killed; defendant previously convicted of killing or ordering others to kill thirteen
others he viewed as threats or disloyal); No Death Penaltyfor P.R. Mass Killer, UPI (Mar. 25, 2013,
8:04 PM), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/World-News/2013/03/25/No-death-penalty-for-PRmass-killerfUPI-14261364256284/
329. See, e.g., Alex Kotlowitz, In the Faceof Death, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 2003, § 6 (Magazine),
at 32 (discussing the impact of mitigating evidence in the case of Jeremy Gross, who was convicted
of a convenience-store robbery murder that was recorded in its entirety on videotape, and depicting
mercy-dispensing jurors as "The Unwitting Abolitionists").
330. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012) (stating that mandatory life without
parole sentences for fourteen-year-olds means that they "will receive the same sentence as the vast
majority of adults committing similar homicide offenses-but, really.., a greater sentence than
those adults will serve"). In a footnote, the Court added: "Although adults are subject as well to the
death penalty in many jurisdictions, very few offenders actually receive that sentence." Id. at 2468
n.7.
331. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
332. See generally ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1 (providing Guidelines and commentary for
defense counsel in capital cases).
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this critical component of capital defense representation. 333 Counsel at
every stage of capital representation would do well to use the Guidelines
for self-assessment and to help courts to understand what effective
representation requires. While the Guidelines do not answer every
question, they provide the most authoritative framework available for
understanding the professional standards relevant to cases where a
human life hangs in the balance. No one has suggested that there is any
other publication that even begins to offer an alternative framework.
To be sure, courts may also want to hear from experts and to review
other authorities specific to the issues in any individual case, particularly
issues pertaining to the prevailing norms at a particular point in time.
However, the Guidelines are the defining architecture for any measure of
effective performance. We hope that this Article has illuminated the
singular importance of the Guidelines as a presumptive source of
guidance in this critical practice area, the value of utilizing the lens of
tort law to envision the quality of representation a competent
professional ought to provide, and the evolution of effective capital
defense practice in the area of individualized sentencing. We hope it will
lead practitioners toward stricter compliance with the norms reflected in
the Guidelines and courts toward clear and consistent performance
standards in capital cases.

333. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 21 (providing further guidance
for capital defense practitioners).
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